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Introduction 
 
 The Ottoman Empire entered the First World War on the November 1, 1914, after three 
months of continuous appeals to both camps of the belligerent powers.1 The actions of the Great 
Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, France, and Great Britain) over the course of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century had placed the Ottoman Empire in a precarious 
position. Despite the Great Powers’ multiple guarantees to maintain the Empire’s territorial 
integrity, over the previous half century the Ottomans had lost some of their most productive and 
populous territories in the Balkans. By 1914, Ottoman statesman feared the possibility of 
partition and no longer viewed diplomacy as a viable option to save the Empire. This concern 
informed Ottoman diplomacy during the crisis that developed after the assassination of Archduke 
Franz Ferdinand in July of 1914. The July Crisis intensified Ottoman concerns about partition 
because a major war threatened to destroy the European balance of power and therefore leave 
Russia with no enemies to restrain its designs on Ottoman territory. Ottoman fears escalated 
when they intercepted Russian telegrams that ignored Ottoman neutrality and called for the 
Empire’s partition.2  
 Russian calls for partition could have been enough cause for Ottoman belligerency, but 
the Empire was in no condition to fight a major war. The Empire had been severely crippled 
financially and militarily after the First and Second Balkan Wars (1912-13). In addition, after the 
start of the First World War the Entente had issued assurances that they would maintain Ottoman 
                         
1. Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire on 1 November 1914. Great Britain and France declared war on 5 
November 1914. The Ottoman Sultan, Mehmed V (1909-18), declared war on the Entente on 11 November 1914.  
2. Mustafa Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 4. These telegrams were from the Russian ambassador to the foreign office. 
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territorial integrity and independence, but the Ottomans knew the Great Powers would quickly 
back out of their agreements if it suited their needs.  
The loss of Ottoman territory almost always preceded a massive humanitarian crisis. 
Between 1878 and 1913, the Muslim population in the Balkans had been subjected to 
extermination and exile. On both occasions a humanitarian crisis had put immense strain on the 
Ottoman economy. When the Great Powers went to war in 1914, Ottoman statesmen believed 
that the war would end quickly and, if they could not rapidly rebuild their economy and military, 
they would not be able to defend themselves and thereby would risk partition. Partition would 
mean the end of the Empire and the security of Ottoman-Muslim citizens. In order to preserve its 
territorial integrity and protect its citizens, Ottoman statesmen took a calculated risk and allied 
with Germany. The deeper catalyst, however, for Ottoman entrance into the First World War was 
a lack of faith in European imperial assurances whose failure had resulted in the earlier territorial 
loses and humanitarian crises in the Balkans. 
Historiography 
 The question of why the Ottomans entered the First World War in 1914 on the side of 
Germany has never had a definitive answer. From the beginning of the war and well into the 
early years of the Turkish Republic, Entente propagandists and Turkish nationalists obscured the 
true motives and goals of the Ottoman government. Their narrative, that the Ottomans were 
incompetent or misguided opportunists, remained the dominant explanation until the middle of 
the century when scholars began to challenge these accounts. This early scholarship proposed 
various causes, for example, that the Empire entered the war because of Enver Paşa’s support for 
Germany, or because Turkish nationalist sentiment expected that the war would save Turks 
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living in hostile states, or that Great Britain pushed the Ottomans away from the Entente by 
ignoring Ottoman fears of Russian aggression and threats of partition. These theories, however, 
failed to consider the previous four decades of European diplomatic betrayals, the breakdown of 
the security apparatus of the Concert of Europe, and the impact of ethnic cleansing on Ottoman 
decision-making.   
In 1914, the British government worried that the large Muslim population in their Empire 
would become a subversive element if Britain opened hostilities against the Ottomans.3 In order 
to remove British responsibility for the Empire’s entrance into the war, they needed to discredit 
the CUP and portray the Ottomans as the aggressors. H.H. Asquith, the British Prime Minister 
(1908-16), expressed this sentiment immediately after the Ottomans entered the war: “it is the 
Ottoman government and not we who have rung the death knell of Ottoman dominion not only in 
Europe, but in Asia.”4 British propagandists presented Ottoman leaders as gamblers who 
recklessly and irresponsibly bet their Empire on pan-Turanist idealism and German victory.5 The 
French Empire also contained a large Muslim population and agreed on the December 31, 1914, 
to pool their anti-Ottoman propaganda with the British.6 The world’s two largest propaganda 
machines pushed the narrative that the Ottomans only entered the war for opportunistic reasons. 
This is the narrative that would influence historians well into the twentieth century.  
                         
3. Altay Cengizer, "The Policies of the Entente Powers toward the Ottoman Empire," in War and Collapse: World 
War I and the Ottoman State, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz and Feroz Ahmad, Utah Series in Middle East Studies (Salt Lake 
City: The University of Utah Press, 2016), 101. 
4. Martin Gilbert, The First World War (New York: Holt, 1994), 105. 
5. Cengizer, "The Policies of the Entente Powers toward the Ottoman Empire," 101. 
6. Ibid., 101.   
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The history of the Ottoman Empire’s entrance into the First World War was further 
obscured by Turkish intellectuals who sought to distance the Republic from the Ottoman state.7 
They claimed that Enver Paşa was a foolish, delusional, pan-Turanist hawk who rashly hitched 
the Empire’s fate to Germany in hopes of attaining new territory and uniting the world’s Turkic 
peoples.8 In contrast, Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938), the founder of the Turkish Republic, was 
portrayed as a genius who saved the Turkish nation from the failing Ottoman Empire.9 These 
works emphasized the superior nature of the Turkish state in comparison to the Ottomans and as 
a result attempted to discredit the CUP leadership.  
AJP Taylor and Ulrich Trumpener expanded on the scholarship of Turkish historians and 
Entente propagandists who had argued that the Ottoman Empire entered the war due to the 
incompetence or opportunism of the leading members of the CUP. Taylor departed from these 
claims by arguing that the Germans had forced the Ottomans into the war. The Ottomans would 
have, in fact, preferred to remain neutral, but were forced to enter the war when German cruisers 
that had been given refuge in Istanbul departed without permission and shelled Odessa.10 Taylor 
accounted for earlier historiography of Ottoman concerns that a British-Russian alliance could 
lead to partition, but his argument that the Germans forced them into war did not account for 
Ottoman agency in the decision.11 
                         
7. Mustafa Aksakal, "Not 'by Those Old Books of International Law, but Only by War'”: Ottoman Intellectuals on 
the Eve of the Great War," Diplomacy and Statecraft 15, no. 3 (2004): 510, accessed February 2, 2015, 
doi:10.1080/09592290490498884; and Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War, 13. 
8. Aksakal, "Not 'by Those Old Books of International Law, but Only by War'”, 510; and Aksakal, The Ottoman 
Road to War, 11.  
9. Aksakal, "Not 'by Those Old Books of International Law, but Only by War'”, 510; and Aksakal, The Ottoman 
Road to War, 11. 
10. A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848- 1918 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), 533. 
11. The Ottomans signed a treaty with Germany on 2nd August 1914 that extended Germany’s Casus Foederis to help 
Austria-Hungary in the event that Russia declared war on the Hapsburgs. The Ottomans were not required to enter 
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Ulrich Trumpener did not agree that Germany forced the Ottomans into war. He found 
that Ottoman leadership was aware of German plans to attack Odessa and, in fact, Enver Paşa 
was the ring leader who conspired to enter the war on the German side by promoting anti-Entente 
propaganda and pressuring the Cabinet for a declaration of war.12 Taylor and Trumpener’s 
scholarship did not overcome the persistence of the “opportunistic” narrative. As late as 1964, 
scholars such as SLA Marshall were continuing to endorse the position that the CUP entered the 
war for reasons of callous opportunism and territorial gain.13 He described them as armature 
gamblers, more vicious than the worst members of the Chicago Outfit, who were incapable of 
understanding the odds against them. Marshall summarized Enver Paşa’s decision to enter the 
war as “cold, cruel, and careless.”14 
The question of who brought the Ottomans into the war is less important than why the 
Ottomans found entry necessary. Authors such as Taylor, Trumpener, and Marshall approached 
the subject from the perspective of the end result, from the perspective that that the Ottoman 
entrance into the war was a mistake. In their analysis, it was a question of blame rather than an 
attempt to understand why the leadership felt that entrance was necessary. Current scholarship 
emphasizes that the Empire’s dire need for a Great Power alliance was due to military and 
                                                                               
the war because Germany declared war on Russia before Russia entered into a state of war with Austria-Hungary. 
See Brigham Young University Library, "The Treaty of Alliance between Germany and Turkey," The World War I 
Document Archive, last modified August 2, 1914, accessed July 26, 2017, 
https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_Treaty_of_Alliance_Between_Germany_and_Turkey. Both parties pledged 
to observe strict neutrality in the war between Serbia and Austria-Hungary. 
12. Ulrich Trumpener, "Turkey's Entry into World War I: An Assessment of Responsibilities," The Journal of 
Modern History 34, no. 4 (December 1962): 370, 372-73, accessed February 2, 2015, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1880054. 
13. S.L.A. Marshall, World War I (New York: Mariner Books, 1964), 121. 
14. Ibid., 121.   
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economic weakness following the Balkan Wars of 1912-13.15  They also investigate the 
ramifications of early Germany victories against Russia, the impact of the refusal of Entente 
Powers to consider Ottoman concerns, and the influence of the intellectual climate within the 
CUP in 1914.   
Alan Palmer, AL Macfie, and David Fromkin argue that Enver Paşa pushed for war 
against the Entente when German victory seemed likely after the Battle of Tannenberg (26 
August 1914). These scholars claim that the Ottomans feared partition if they remained neutral or 
aligned with the losing powers. They also maintain that the Ottomans approached both the 
Entente and Central Powers for an alliance, but both camps refused because an alliance with the 
Ottomans was seen as a liability.16  
The British seizure of the Ottoman dreadnaughts features in each of these analyses. In 
1914, the British held two dreadnaughts that were under construction in Britain for the Ottoman 
Navy. The Ottomans had paid for these ships through public conscription and loans, and the 
public was outraged by Britain’s actions. Palmer and Macfie contend that Churchill’s seizure of 
these prized ships empowered Enver Paşa’s pro-German faction and discredited the pro-Entente 
side of the CUP.17 Fromkin adds that the Ottomans offered the seized ships to the Germans in 
                         
15. David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace (New York: Holt, 1989), 48; Charles D. Haley, "The Desperate 
Ottoman: Enver Pasha and the German Empire- II," Middle Eastern Studies 30, no. 2 (April 1994): 234, accessed 
April 4, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283632; Sean McMeekin, The Ottoman Endgame: War, Revolution, and 
the Making of the Modern Middle East, 1908- 1923 (New York: Penguin Press, 2015), 86; Ahmad, "The Dilemmas 
of Young Turk Policy, 1914-1918," 66; Eugene Rogan, The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle 
East (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 39; and Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War, 2.   
16. Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 49; Alan Palmer, The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire, 2009 ed., 
Barnes and Noble Rediscovers (1992; repr., New York: Barnes & Noble, 2009), 247-49; Charles D. Haley, "The 
Desperate Ottoman: Enver Pasha and the German Empire- I," Middle Eastern Studies 30, no. 1 (January 1994): 25, 
accessed April 4, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283613; and A.L. MacFie, "The Straits Question in the First 
World War," Middle Eastern Studies 19, no. 1 (January 1983): 44, accessed February 2, 2015, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4282922. 
17. Palmer, The Decline and Fall, 249; and Macfie, "The Straits Question in the First World War," 44.  
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order to secure a Great Power alliance.18 At the time of the offer, Germany was unaware that the 
British had taken the ships but, after they found out, they did not suspect Ottoman duplicity so 
the alliance remained intact.19  
Macfie’s study stands apart from Palmer’s and Fromkin’s as he places greater emphasis 
on the British seizure of the dreadnaughts. Although Palmer and Fromkin account for the British 
seizure of the ships being part of the Ottoman’s decision to secure and alliance with Germany, 
they believe the main factors were Enver Paşa’s pro-German sympathies and Russia’s military 
collapse at Tannenberg. Macfie agrees that Enver Paşa was pro-Germany and had insisted on an 
alliance. But he also argues that Enver Paşa was not able to convince the cabinet because of 
dissenting opinion in the CUP. Britain’s seizure of the dreadnaughts, however, gave Enver Paşa’s 
faction greater credibility, which was further cemented with the arrival and sale of two German 
cruisers, the Breslau and Goeben. 20 From this point forward, Enver Paşa and his supporters 
successfully pressured his political opponents into a course of action against the Entente.21 
Palmer and Fromkin insist that Ottoman neutrality ended with Tannenberg. The battle convinced 
the CUP that Russia could no longer mount any offensive actions against the Central Powers and 
thus the Ottomans were free to attack Russian territory without severe consequences.22 At this 
point, Enver Paşa believed that if the Ottomans did not join the war soon, and the Germans won 
an unaided victory, they would forfeit any right to territorial concessions against Russia.23 Before 
this battle most members of the CUP had been unwilling to stake the future of the Empire on 
                         
18. Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 61.  
19. Ibid., 61.   
20. Macfie, "The Straits Question in the First World War," 44; and Macfie, The End of the Ottoman Empire, 124.   
21. Ibid., 44.   
22. Palmer, The Decline and Fall, 251.   
23. Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 70; and Palmer, The Decline and Fall, 251. 
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German victory. Afterwards, most of the cabinet joined Enver Paşa, and the government began to 
draft plans for intervention.24  
Feroz Ahmad and Altay Cengizer deemphasize Enver Paşa’s influence and place more 
importance on the motivations of the CUP leadership, which was more concerned with 
geopolitical exigencies. Like Palmer, MacFie, and Fromkin, they agree that the Ottomans feared 
the possibility of partition should the Empire fail to secure an ally.25 This scholarship also 
focuses on the unpopular capitulatory regime, which had for centuries given European countries 
special legal and economic privileges and had long denied the Ottomans full control over their 
economy. The Entente Powers had continued to refuse any attempt by the Ottomans to end these 
concessions.26 At the core of Ahmad and Cengizer’s argument is the assertion that the Entente 
conducted an antagonistic foreign policy towards the Ottomans because they believed that the 
Empire was neither a threat nor a worthwhile ally, and that therefore there was no gain in 
granting its demands.27 Cengizer agrees that Tannenberg played a major role in bringing the 
Ottomans into the war, but he claims that the German-Ottoman alliance was the direct result of 
Entente politics and British ambivalence.28 The Ottomans were particularly concerned that a 
Russian-German peace treaty after Tannenberg might lead to the Germans offering the 
Bosphorus Straits to Russia as a prize for making peace.29 In fact, the Ottomans knew that 
Russian ambassadors were threating to sign a peace treaty with Germany in order to leverage 
                         
24. Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 70-71.   
25. Ahmad, "The Dilemmas of Young Turk Policy, 1914-1918," 66, 68; and Cengizer, "The Policies of the Entente 
Powers toward the Ottoman Empire," 86-87.   
26. Ahmad, "The Dilemmas of Young Turk Policy, 1914-1918," 67-69. The Great Powers wanted the Ottomans to 
wait until after the war to ask for any adjustments to Ottomans sovereignty, such as the capitulations. 
27. Cengizer, "The Policies of the Entente Powers toward the Ottoman Empire," 98-99.  
28. Ibid., 103, 108-9.  
29. Ibid., 104.  
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Great Britain and France to concede to their control over the Bosphorus. The Ottoman-German 
alliance was intended to prevent the loss of the straits and future partition.30 Ahmad takes a 
different approach from Cengizer and maintains that the Ottomans joined the war because they 
were near financial collapse.31 As late as August 1914, the CUP leadership felt that armed 
neutrality was the best policy because the Empire’s financial crisis made sustained mobilization 
untenable. In fact, the treasury could not meet such a financial burden. The Ottomans were 
nevertheless forced to mobilize out of fear of territorial loses. The Entente subsequently refused 
financial aid but the Germans agreed to support the Ottoman war effort, thereby pushing the 
Ottomans into an alliance with Germany.32  
Ryan Gingeras, Mustafa Aksakal, and Sean McMeekin agree on the general weakened 
state of the Empire’s military and finances, but they place deeper emphasis on the Balkan Wars 
and the intellectual climate within the CUP in 1914. Their analysis of the decision to enter the 
First World War reaches back into the late nineteenth century when Ottoman bureaucrats realized 
that diplomacy was no longer going to ensure their security. 33 The Ottoman Empire’s entry into 
the Concert of Europe in 1856 had come with assurances from the Great Powers that their 
territorial integrity would be maintained. Contrary to these diplomatic agreements, the Empire 
had steadily lost a significant amount of territory.34  
By the First Balkan War of 1912, the Great Powers were no longer offering any assistance 
as the Ottomans were being expelled from their European territories. When they managed to 
                         
30. Ibid., 104.  
31. Ahmad, "The Dilemmas of Young Turk Policy, 1914-1918," 67-68.  
32. Ibid., 68.   
33. Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War, 9.   
34. Ibid., 4-5.  
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regain territory in Thrace at the start of the Second Balkan War in 1913, the Ottomans realized 
that only military power could preserve the Empire.35 Gingeras, Aksakal, and McMeekin claim 
that this victory imbued the CUP with a revanchist Turkish nationalism that sought to regain 
territory in order to defend the Empire and assist Ottoman Muslims and ethnic Turks who were 
suffering under foreign rule.36 During the period following the Second Balkan War, Ottoman 
statesmen and other intellectuals began to call for increased military spending and military action 
to protect Muslims and ethnic Turks across Ottoman borders.  
Gingeras and Aksakal have also reasoned that Ottoman military weakness necessitated a 
secure alliance and the July Crisis in 1914 provided this opportunity.37 The CUP believed that an 
alliance would allow time to stabilize their economy and rebuild their military.38 Both Gingeras 
and Aksakal agree that the German ultimatum in October forced the Ottoman Empire into the 
Great War.39 Germany had informed the Ottomans that they should immediately join the Central 
Powers on the battlefield or Germany would stop all military aid and remove its cruisers from 
Istanbul, which would have crushed Ottoman plans to quickly rebuild the military.40 Gingeras 
further claims that the ultimatum gave Enver Paşa and his supporters the reason to apply more 
                         
35. Ibid., 4-5, 9, 19, 24.  
36. Gingeras, The Fall of the Sultanate, 104-6; Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War, 20-27; and McMeekin, The 
Ottoman Endgame, 84. 
37. Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War, 193-94. After 1850 the Ottomans began to lose their military production 
capabilities. This fostered a dependency on foreign arms leading the Ottomans to decline below a third-tier military 
power by 1914. For most of the Empire’s history it was a third-tier producer. The first-tier innovates new weaponry. 
The second tier adapts and exports arms to other countries. The third-tier imports new technology and builds an 
indigenous arms industry. Historically the Empire’s primary rivals were third-tier powers or lower. See Jonathan 
Grant, "Rethinking the Ottoman 'Decline': Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire, Fifteenth to 
Eighteenth Centuries," Journal of World History 10, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 181-83, 200-201, accessed March 17, 
2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20078753. 
38. Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War, 13; McMeekin, The Ottoman Endgame, 86; and Gingeras, Fall of the 
Sultanate, 106-7.   
39. Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War, 186; and Gingeras, Fall of the Sultanate, 108.  
40. Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War, 186; and Gingeras, Fall of the Sultanate, 108. 
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pressure on CUP factions who wanted to remain neutral.41 After a final round of internal 
meetings, the neutralists realized they could not abandon the Empire’s only alliance and they 
caved, giving the leadership the break they needed to declare war. 42  
Gingeras and Aksakal advance earlier scholarship by examining how the Ottoman 
experience over the previous half century influenced the worldview of the CUP. They focus on 
Ottoman bitterness and distrust towards the European international system. Although the catalyst 
forcing the Ottomans to drop their position of neutrality was the potential loss of their alliance 
with Germany, the Ottomans also knew that diplomacy was now futile and war was necessary. 
This study builds on the scholarship of Gingeras and Aksakal and will assert that Turkish 
nationalism was not a significant factor in the CUP’s decision to enter the war. Their decision 
was based primarily on the desire to protect Ottoman Muslims, and on the belief that Entente 
guarantees were meaningless and partition was almost certain in the event of a German defeat. 
Recent events had convinced the Ottomans that they faced not only partition but also the threat of 
ethnic cleansing should the Empire collapse. Defeats had led to territorial losses and forcible 
conversions, murder, and exile of Ottoman Muslims in newly formed Balkan states. Many of 
these refugees had died in Ottoman domains because the government was unprepared to take on 
such a massive influx of people. By 1914 the leaders of the CUP understood that partition was 
very likely and with that realization came the fear of the possibility of an even greater ethnic 
cleansing of Muslims from partitioned Ottoman territory.  
 
                         
41. Gingeras, Fall of the Sultanate, 108.   
42. Ibid., 108. Bulgaria also declared her intentions to respect Ottoman sovereignty. Bulgarian support played a role 
in shifting Ottoman support over to active participation in the war. 
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Chapter Outline 
 The first chapter argues that the ideological principles of Europe’s international system 
(The Concert of Europe) essentially barred the Ottomans from participating as full members. 
Research will show that from the beginning, the Ottomans trusted European guarantees of 
security and territorial integrity and intended to utilize the codes and precedents of international 
law to provide lasting security for the state. By the late nineteenth century, however, the 
Europeans had developed an exclusionary meaning of citizenship that affected their application 
of international law. This shift would shake Ottoman faith in the system. 
 The second chapter examines the lack of Great Power support for the Ottomans during 
the Russian-Ottoman War of 1877-78, and the Ottoman’s understanding that this was a major 
failure of European diplomatic guarantees. The Ottoman’s loss of confidence in the reliability of 
the Concert of Europe led to an important change in their foreign policy that pushed them away 
from reliance on diplomacy and from trust in international agreements. 
The third chapter analyzes the period between the Russian-Ottoman War of 1877-78 and 
the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. It examines the refugee crises that resulted from these wars as well 
as the ethnic cleansing perpetrated by Russia and the Balkan states. Two major refugee crises 
influenced Ottoman domestic policy and shifted the Empire’s identity from the ideology of civic 
Ottomanism, or Ottoman “official nationalism,” to one centered on Islam as a pan-national 
identity. Ethnic cleansing also imbued the Ottomans with a siege mentality, a belief that the 
whole Islamic world was under attack and that only Ottoman military strength could save it.   
 The final chapter will claim that the Ottomans entered the First World War because of an 
unreliable international system that had caused instability in the Balkans and created the 
13 
 
conditions for ethnic cleansing. This part of the study will examine events from July through 
November 1914, contextualized within the previous four decades, to demonstrate that the 
Concert of Europe’s broken guarantees, and the Ottoman’s experiences with ethnic cleansing and 
humanitarian crises, left them with no alternative but to enter the war on the side of the Central 
Powers. 
14 
 
Chapter I: The Ottoman Empire in the Eurocentric International System 
 A long process of European-Ottoman diplomatic failures informed the Ottoman 
government’s decision to enter the First World War as an ally of Germany. This process began 
with the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1856 that ended the Crimean War and ushered the 
Ottoman Empire into the Concert of Europe. It provided the Ottoman Empire with guarantees 
that foreign states would not impinge upon the Empire's sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
Despite this, revolts in the Balkans during 1875 and 1876 tested the guarantees of the Treaty’s 
signatory states who refused to uphold their pledges. The unwillingness of Great Britain, France, 
Austria, and Prussia to maintain their agreements proved to be disastrous for the Empire and 
ushered in a period when the Ottomans recognized that they could not rely on the signatory 
powers for international support. 
 This chapter examines the intellectual foundations of the European international system, 
the admittance of the Ottoman Empire into the Concert of Europe in 1856, and the justification 
of Great Britain for abandoning the Empire in the 1870s. Early in the nineteenth century, 
European statesmen believed international law applied only to civilized states. They 
conceptualized civilization as universal and attainable by all peoples, regardless of cultural 
difference, after they had reached a level of material and intellectual progress. The entry of the 
Ottoman Empire into the Concert of Europe in 1856 was based on the acknowledgement of the 
Great Powers that the Tanzimat reform program had ushered the Ottomans into the rank of 
civilized nations. By the 1870s, however, the Great Powers’ definition of civilization had 
evolved and was now based on cultural difference, which meant that the Ottoman Empire was to 
be excluded from the international system. Because civilization was no long universal and 
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attainable there was now an impassable border between the “civilized” and “non-civilized” 
worlds. The Ottomans, however, were initially unaware of this change. They believed they were 
a member of the Concert, considered the guarantees binding, and factored the rights accorded by 
the Treaty of Paris into their foreign policy. The Ottomans only became aware of their exclusion 
from the system during the disastrous Russian-Ottoman War of 1877-78. The decision of the 
Great Powers to deny the Empire full integration into the international system would lead 
Ottoman leadership to reformulate their foreign policy.  
The Crimean War, the Treaty of Paris, and the Concert of Europe 
 The origin of the Crimean War is obscure but historians generally agree that Great Britain 
and France joined the Ottoman Empire to defend against Russian expansionist policies.1 The 
initial dispute was over Russian (Orthodox) or French (Catholic) pre-eminence over the holy 
sites of Jerusalem and Bethlehem.2 Hoping to expand Russian influence in the Balkans, Tsar 
Nicolas I took advantage of the crisis and attempted to convince Great Britain that the time was 
right for the partition of the Ottoman Empire. The Tsar, however, misjudged British and French 
                         
1. Brison D. Gooch, "A Century of Historiography on the Origins of the Crimean War," The American Historical 
Review 62, no. 1 (October 1956): 33, accessed January 7, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1848511; Sean 
McMeekin, The Ottoman Endgame: War, Revolution, and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 1908-1923 (New 
York: Penguin Press, 2015), 10; Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-
1999 (New York: Penguin Books, 2000), 84;  Caroline Finkel, Osman's Dream (New York, NY: Basic Books, 
2007), 457; M. Şȕkrȕ Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2008), 78-79; M. Hakan Yavuz, "The Transformation of 'Empire' through Wars and Reforms: Integration Vs. 
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intentions to maintain the status quo and the current balance of power. 3 In February of 1853 he 
sent an ultimatum to the Sultan demanding that his Orthodox subjects be placed under Russian 
protection. When the Ottomans rejected the ultimatum, Russia invaded the principalities of 
Moldavia and Wallachia, which compelled Britain and France to send warships to 
Constantinople.4 Constantinople erupted in joy early in the war when news reached the city of 
several victories against Russia in Wallachia and the Caucasus.5 Although these early successes 
would lead to later defeats, the Empire appeared revitalized after nearly a century of military 
losses. 6 
 On February 18, 1853, Sultan Abdülmecid I issued the Hatt-ı Hümayun, an imperial order 
that would exert considerable influence on future events. This decree reaffirmed the rights given 
in the Hatt-ı Şerif-i Gȕlhane (1839) that all subjects were guaranteed security of life, property, 
and honor regardless of class or religion.7 Abdülmecid I stated that this reaffirmation of minority 
rights was to "submit to my Sublime Porte the reforms required by the progress of civilization 
and of the age."8 Geopolitically, however, the intent was to weaken Russian claims of protection 
over the Empire's Orthodox subjects.9 One month before the Sultan’s decree, the British 
ambassador at Constantinople had sent a memorandum to the Ottomans, which stated, 
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The question of privileges accorded... to the Christian communities is so bound up with 
that of administrative reforms that both seem...within the same compass. To bring them 
closer together in such a way as to cause all differences to disappear that separate the 
Moslems from the Rayahs would be a giant step...toward the regeneration of the empire 
[sic]."10  
 
The Sultan’s decision to reaffirm the equality of his subjects was also a strategic move 
intended to convince Great Britain that the Empire was a civilized state deserving admittance 
into the Concert of Europe. Britain and France were the strongest advocates for bringing the 
Ottomans into the international system, but in return they also demanded concessions to the 
Christian populations.11 The declaration of the Hatt-ı Hümayun succeeded in convincing the 
Great Powers that the Empire was a civilized state that should be admitted into the international 
system. This decision was evident in Article IX of the Treaty of Paris which stated that due to the 
decree’s "generous intentions” towards the Christian populations of the Empire, the Powers of 
Europe had no right to interfere in Ottoman internal affairs.12  
 Article VII of the Treaty also declared that the Empire was to be “admitted to participate 
in the advantages of the Public Law and System (concert) of Europe.”13 Austria, Sardinia, France, 
Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain agreed “to respect the Independence and Territorial integrity of 
the Ottoman Empire." 14 In recent years, scholars have portrayed the Crimean War as a pyrrhic 
                         
10. Ed Engelhardt, "The Right of Intervention and Turkey- a Historical Research," Appendix xvii to Capitulations of 
the Ottoman Empire, by Edward A. Van Dyck (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1881), 126. 
11. Glenny, The Balkans, 84.   
12. "The Treaty of Peace (Paris) Terminating the Crimean War, with Pertinent Annexed Conventions 1856," 
in Diplomacy in the Middle East, I:154; "Sultan Abdülmecid's Hatti Hümayun," in Diplomacy in the Middle East, 
I:150-51; and "The Hatt-I-Serif Decree Initiates the Tanzimat, or Reform, Period of the Ottoman Empire, November 
3, 1839," in Sources in the History of the Modern Middle East, ed. Akram Fouad Khater, 2nd ed. (Boston: 
Wadsworth, 2011), 11-14. Throughout the early nineteenth century, and continuing after the Crimean War, the 
European powers would utilize the lack of rights towards Christians as justification for intervention. The Hatt-ı Şerif-
i Gȕlhane (1839) and Hatt-ı Hümayun (1856) were partially issued in response to European arguments justifying 
intervention into Ottoman sovereignty. See Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 400.    
13. "The Treaty of Peace (Paris)," in Diplomacy in the Middle East, I:154.  
14. Ibid., I:154. 
18 
 
victory for the Ottomans since it limited the Russian threat only to the European Powers and thus 
made the Ottomans a buffer in the Balkans.15 At the time, however, the Ottoman government 
viewed the Treaty as an unqualified victory and saw its guarantees as binding. Ottoman 
diplomats operated on the assumption that the signatory powers would uphold its provisions and 
support the maintenance of the Empire's territorial integrity and independence.16 
 The Treaty of Paris provided the framework upon which the Ottoman Empire was to base 
its foreign policy. As shown above, Article VII admitted the Empire into the Concert of Europe 
and stated that the contracting parties agreed in common to respect the independence and 
integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Article VIII created mechanisms for mediation to avoid conflict 
should a dispute arise between parties. Article IX confirmed that the Hatt-ı Hümayun removed 
any cause that would justify European intervention.17 Great Britain, Austria, and France also 
signed a separate treaty with the Ottoman Empire that further guaranteed its integrity and 
provided swift action and cooperation if any Power breached the conditions of the Treaty.18 
 The Russian-Ottoman War of 1877-78 occurred after a series of foreign interventions in 
Ottoman affairs. After the Crimean War in 1856, engagements in Syria (1860-61) and Crete 
(1866-68) were undertaken with legal justification based on Treaty of Paris guarantees and with 
the cooperation, if not complete support, of Ottoman authorities. 19 The first intervention 
occurred when Britain and France embarked on a humanitarian mission after the start of a civil 
                         
15. Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, 82; Hanioğlu stated "But the very success of Ottoman 
diplomacy in the Crimean War undermined its long-term viability, for the victory over Russia brought about a 
reduction in the British perception of Russia as a threat."  
16. Yavuz, "The Transformation of 'Empire,'" 51, note 23. 
17. "The Treaty of Peace (Paris)," in Diplomacy in the Middle, I:154. 
18. "Treaty Guaranteeing the Independence and Integrity of the Ottoman Empire: Austria, France, and Britain, 
1856,” in Diplomacy in the Middle East, I:156.   
19. Rodogno, Against Massacre, 19.  
19 
 
war between Maronites and Druze. The Conference of Paris (1860) justified intervention by 
referencing Article IX of the Treaty of Paris which guaranteed the rights of Ottoman Christians.20 
European involvement gained further legal legitimacy through British and French claims that the 
unrest in the region threatened Ottoman territorial integrity.21 The Ottoman government 
consented to, and assisted with, the humanitarian intervention. The second intervention occurred 
in 1866 when Cretan Christians revolted against Ottoman attempts to enforce the Tanzimat 
reforms.22 The British and French joined forces to support the Ottoman Empire out of fear of 
Russian expansion. They obtained Ottoman permission for the intervention and did not infringe 
upon the Empire’s sovereignty.23 Unlike these two interventions, however, the Russian-Ottoman 
War was not justifiable according to the Treaty of Paris, did not involve the consent or 
cooperation of the Ottoman government, and was a direct threat to the Empire’s vital interests.  
 One has to consider the context in which European international law and the intellectual 
foundations of the Concert of Europe were created in order to understand why Ottoman reliance 
on the system was to lead to the failure of their foreign policy. As mentioned above, in the early 
nineteenth century the international system was based on the concept of a universal civilization 
that could include all cultures.24 By the late nineteenth century, however, a form of relativism 
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based on religion and culture placed restrictions on admittance into the international system. 
These changes were prompted by jurists attempting to justify colonialism by claiming that only 
the spread of European culture could create the conditions for the development of civilization.25 
The Ottomans, however, believed in the earlier European universalist understanding of 
civilization and were unaware that their religion and culture had become a barrier towards full 
membership in the international system.   
 The Great Powers created the Concert of Europe in 1815 as a reaction against the French 
Revolution and Napoleon's attempt to create a unified Europe. The Concert sought to maintain 
the independence of European states and preserve their individual legal and social systems.26 
European diplomats and statesmen created this framework in an effort to preserve the status quo 
and existing power structures. The system operated by convening the major Powers (Great 
Britain, France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria) at times of international crises with the goal of 
upholding peace and generating solutions to conflicts. The Concert was "a conceptual norm 
among the Great Powers of the proper and permissible aims and methods of international 
behavior, one that transcended ideological division... "27 This was a semi-formal body that 
operated according to accepted international norms and laws that were not explicitly codified and 
were, therefore, subject to being influenced by the prevailing ideologies of the time.  
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 The primary assumption behind the Concert of Europe was the complete domination by 
the Great Powers who had the sole right to decide European affairs.28 Non-great power states had 
few rights, and the Great Powers were not required to consult with them prior to intervention.29 
The founding states established several rules to maintain the status quo and prevent open 
hostilities. These included a ban on waging war solely for territorial gain, a prohibition against 
promoting unrest and revolution in another state, and an injunction against humiliating or 
challenging a Great Power in a matter of its vital interest. 30 This last prohibition was of 
particular importance because European statesmen believed that humiliating or challenging a 
Great Power in a matter of its vital interest was a certain way to generate open hostilities.31 If a 
major problem arose between parties, all states were required to attend the conference and none 
could be excluded.32 
 European statesmen believed in a hierarchy of states. The Great Powers were a group 
apart from other non-member states, and no Great Power had preeminence or supremacy over 
another member.33 They justified this hierarchy through the conviction that the leading members 
of the Concert worked in the collective interests of the Continent. This hierarchy was also 
supported by the principle of civilization, an idea that became fundamental for maintaining and 
regulating the international order.34 According to the intellectuals who conceptualized this system 
in the mid-nineteenth century, international laws only applied to sovereign civilized states that 
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were exempt from Great Power meddling or intervention into their internal affairs.35 Jurists 
utilized this framework to define which states were considered “civilized” and which were 
designated “uncivilized,” and to legitimize intervention into the affairs of those states that 
remained non-civilized.36 The international system thereby codified a hierarchy of states where 
the Great Powers dominated non-great power European states. The latter were still considered 
civilized and under the protection of international law, unlike “uncivilized” non-European states 
that fell outside of the system and its legal guarantees. 
 In 1828 Francois Guizot, a French historian and statesman, defined the concept of 
civilization as intrinsically tied to progress: 
It appears to me that the first fact comprised in the word civilization...is the fact of 
progress, of development; it presents at once the idea of a people marching onwards, not 
to change its place, but to change its condition; of a people whose culture is conditioning 
itself, and ameliorating itself.37 
 
Guizot defined progress as the perfecting of civil life, society, and man himself.38 He emphasized 
that throughout history there had been great crises that changed man, his creed, his external 
condition, and his relation to fellow man.39 Christianity was one of these great crises of 
civilization because it "changed the internal man, creeds, sentiments; because it regenerated the 
moral man, the intellectual man."40 
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 Guizot portrayed European civilization as the pinnacle "of a linearly developing world 
history."41 He maintained that it was a distinct form of civilization that was hierarchal and at the 
forefront of progress. 
I have used the term European civilization, because it is evident that there is an [sic] 
European civilization; that a certain unity pervades the civilization of the various 
European states; that, notwithstanding infinite diversities of time, place,  and 
circumstance, this civilization takes its first rise in facts almost wholly similar, proceeds 
everywhere upon the same principles, and tends to produce well nigh everywhere 
analogous results.42  
 
He continued, 
For my own part, I am convinced that there is, in reality, a general destiny of humanity, a 
transmission of the aggregate of civilization; and consequently, an [sic] universal history 
of civilization to be written. But without raising questions so great, so difficult to solve, if 
we restrict ourselves to a definite limit of time and space, if we confine ourselves to the 
history of a certain number of centuries, of a certain people, it is evident that within these 
bounds, civilization is a fact that can  be described, related— which is history.43 
 
Guizot limited his analysis to Europe where he believed there was a unified level of progress in 
civilization. John Stuart Mill was more assertive in stressing the link between European culture 
and civilization, stating that "all [the elements of civilization] exist in modern Europe, and 
especially in Great Britain, in a more eminent degree...than at any other place or time."44 For both 
John Stuart Mill and Francois Guizot, it was evident that the highest form of civilization lay 
within Europe.45  
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 Although Guizot did not assert that civilization was exclusive to Europe, he was a 
dedicated Calvinist and believed that Christianity created the conditions for the continent’s 
civilizational superiority, particularly over the Islamic world. He stated, 
In the Christian world, the spiritual and the temporal powers were distinct...The 
Germans...they became Christians but not missionaries. The Arabs, on the  contrary, were 
both conquerors and missionaries... At a later period, this character determined the 
unfortunate turn taken by Mussulman civilization; it is in the combination of the spiritual 
and the temporal powers... that the tyranny which seems inherent in this civilization 
originated. This I conceive to be the cause of the stationary condition into which that 
civilization is everywhere fallen.46 
 
Christianity and European civilization were inseparable but, unlike other civilizations, religion 
did not dominate the state. The superiority of western civilization was, in fact, the result of the 
separation of church and state.   
 In 1845, Henry Wheaton, a specialist in international law, linked the concept of 
civilization to Christianity and to European culture, and contrasted it with the condition of the 
Ottoman Empire.47 He argued that the Europeans only respected Ottoman territorial integrity to 
maintain the balance of power.48 He further explained that although they had brought the 
Ottomans into the international system, public law was "founded on that community of manners, 
institutions and religion, which distinguishes the nations of Christendom from those of the 
Mohammedan world."49 Public law only applied to European states because of their superior 
level of civilization. Wheaton asked, "Is there a uniform law of nations?” He answered, “There 
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certainly is not the same one for all the nations and states of the world. The public law, with 
slight exceptions, has been, and still is, limited to the civilized and Christian people of Europe or 
to those of European origin."50 Wheaton argued that the Ottomans belonged to a group of states 
that were not bound by the "general international law of Christendom.” Thus, they did not have 
the privilege of sovereignty and had no right to complain about the interventions of Christian 
states into their affairs.51 Wheaton repeatedly referred to the Ottomans as a barbaric people who 
fought against Christian Greeks, the exemplar of civilization, in the Greek War of Independence 
(1821-29).52 In 1916, a revised and expanded edition of Wheaton's work echoed this sentiment in 
harsher terms that adopted the imperial rhetoric of the age: "The Turks are not a civilizing 
people. They are a nation of soldiers, who care little for the peaceful pursuits of trade, literature, 
and science; while many of their subjects [the Christian ra'aya] are capable of attaining the 
highest forms of civilization."53 Wheaton’s contrast between Ottoman Muslim and Christian 
subjects highlighted his belief that civilization was dependent upon one’s culture.  
 In an article published on April 3, 1858, the British newspaper Leader demonstrated the 
connection between civilization and Christianity as it was developing in European public 
thought. The writer stated that it was only a matter of time before the Ottoman Empire splintered 
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into Christian states.54 He presaged language that was to be used over the course of the next 
eighty years when he wrote that the "Turk" was a soldier and incapable of becoming an 
agriculturalist or merchant. For more than a century the Ottomans had attempted to adopt 
European styles and methods in a bid to become civilized, but "a bad Asiatic does not make a 
good European. To wear Paris boots, to eat pork, to wallow in wine-bibbing...to ape Western 
fashions and trample upon Mohamedanism without embracing Christianity, is not to progress but 
to recede, and this has been the policy of the Turks in Europe."55 The most recent Ottoman 
reforms of the Hatt-ı Hümayun and the earlier "Magna Charta of Gullhané" were Christian 
charters and "monuments of Turkish humiliation."56 Even when the Ottomans instituted reforms, 
the writer did not give them agency but, instead, presented the reforms as a poor attempt at 
emulating European and Christian laws. The term "Magna Charta of Gullhané" is indicative of 
the European unwillingness to credit the Ottomans with civilizational progress. The Hatt-ı Şerif-i 
Gȕlhane bore little resemblance to the Magna Carta, which involved primarily medieval property 
rights and guaranteed a fair trial only to free men. In contrast, the Hatt-ı Şerif-i Gȕlhane secured 
all Ottoman subjects security of life, honor, and property. The author of the article compared 
them as though Ottoman reforms were merely an imitation of European law. Additionally, 
because of its Islamic character, the Empire could not successfully imitate Christian Powers. This 
depiction of the Ottomans bears similarities to both the original (1836) and revised edition 
(1916) of Wheaton's Elements of International Law, which used almost identical language. The 
continuity of ideas between these works spanned eighty years and demonstrates the endurance of 
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the image of Ottoman cultural inferiority in relation to Europe.  
In a report presented before the Congress of the United States in 1881, Edward A. Van 
Dyck, the consular clerk of the United States at Cairo, wrote about the connection between 
Christianity, international law, and civilization. He maintained that relations between the 
Christian and Islamic world were not based on the "principles of the law of nations. International 
law, as professed by the civilized nations of Christendom, is the offspring of the communion of 
ideas subsisting between them."57 Van Dyke argued that Christian states advanced through a 
shared culture and they developed a uniform international law. Although the Ottoman Empire 
had adopted some Western reforms and was gradually approaching the level of civilization in 
Europe, the international law of Christendom did not apply because the only principle of 
international law for Muslim jurists concerned holy war.58  
Halil Halid, an Ottoman statesman who lived in exile in England, wrote in 1907 about the 
connections between the European understanding of civilization and Christianity. He argued that 
many Europeans believed that the term "civilized world" applied exclusively to Christian 
countries while they relegated the entirety of the Orient to "semi-civilized" or "barbaric."59 Halid 
reasoned that "...no people which does not belong to the community of Christendom seems to be 
regarded as civilized."60 According to him European states utilized the presumed uncivilized 
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nature of the Orient as a justification for territorial gains and the systematic domination of the 
east.61 Halid concluded that Europeans saw the destruction of Islamic countries as a victory for 
civilization and progress.62 He recognized that the Great Powers were using the idea of 
civilization as a tool to prevent Ottoman participation in the international system.  
 Two decades earlier James Lorimer, an influential Scottish professor of public law, had 
articulated the framework through which Europeans could dismiss Ottoman reforms. He devised 
a three-tiered system that categorized civilizations as civilized, barbaric, and savage.63 Lorimer 
believed that only some states were able to assume a role of leadership on the international stage 
and the Ottoman Empire could not be included among them because it was a "barbaric" power.64 
Ottoman sovereignty, accordingly, could be completely ignored due to the ineffectiveness of their 
system of governance and their rank among the "barbaric" states.65 
 The Ottomans and the Europeans had different definitions of the meaning of civilization. 
After the Crimean War in 1856, Ottoman elites considered themselves European with no cultural 
or religious obstacles to being included in the ranks of civilized countries.66 Writing shortly after 
the Crimean War, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, a long-serving Ottoman bureaucrat and intellectual, 
argued that at any given time civilization was universal and existed in the most advanced 
cultures. Civilization had moved from Egypt, China, and Muslim Mesopotamia to Europe, with 
each culture leaving its imprint.67 Ottoman intellectuals believed in a teleological view of history 
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whereby civilization would reach a height and all cultures and peoples would share in this final 
stage.  
30 
 
The Failure of Ottoman Integration into the Continental System 
 By the middle of the 1870s, Ottoman statesmen had concluded that their membership in 
the Concert of Europe and its associated guarantees would not secure the Empire’s territorial 
integrity. European imperial chauvinism had ignored Ottoman sovereignty during the Russian-
Ottoman War. The Great Powers had refused to grant the Ottomans the same military, economic, 
and diplomatic privileges afforded other member states, and denied them the right to participate 
in conferences that concerned their vital interests.      
 A revolt in the Balkans during the 1870s started the process of European abandonment of 
the Ottoman Empire. In July 1875, just prior to the outbreak of war with Russia, Slav peasants in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina revolted against their Muslim landowners.1 Under pressure from the Great 
Powers, the Ottoman proposed reforms intended to quell the revolt, but they were not satisfactory 
to an emboldened Russia gripped by pan-Slavic fervor.2 Austria-Hungary's Foreign Minister, 
Count Gyula Andrassy, in accordance with the Concert's mission, made every attempt to devise a 
compromise that would preserve the status quo and, by extension, the European balance of 
power. Events rapidly escalated and by April 1876, Bulgaria erupted in a rebellion for national 
independence. By June, Serbia and Montenegro had declared war on the Empire in an attempt to 
liberate Bosnian Christians from "Mussulman fanaticism."3 The Ottomans immediately accused 
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the Serbian government of supporting the insurgents and acting as an aggressor state.4 They 
issued a memorandum, stating, "but the day came when Servia, in despair of exhausting the 
patience of the Sublime Porte, at last throwing aside the mask...openly declared war, which 
practically she had more or less carried on in disguise for several months past."5 Documents 
found on the leaders of the Bulgarian insurrection confirmed the Ottoman government's 
accusations. A list of orders instructed the insurgents to cross the Sava River, murder any 
Muslims and guards, and open communications with the nearest village.6 The insurgents were to 
announce to the villagers that they had come in support of Serbia and were giving the villagers 
arms to aid the rebellion. Their mission was to harass and weaken Ottoman defenses in 
preparation for the Serbian invasion of Bosnia.7 Ottoman armies initially achieved significant 
military victories against Serbia and Montenegro, but their efforts to suppress the rebellions and 
mounting civilian casualties turned public opinion in Europe against them.8 Only two decades 
earlier, Great Britain had viewed the Ottomans as a liberal empire. Now the Empire's closest ally 
considered them Muslim tyrants who were the oppressors of Christians.9  
 The Ottomans were unable to capitalize on their victories against Serbia due to a Russian 
ultimatum issued on October 19, 1876, which proclaimed the bloodshed unacceptable and 
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demanded an end to the war.10 The Ottomans agreed to the demands shortly thereafter, but Tsar 
Alexander II was not satisfied and threatened that if the Great Powers could not agree to peace on 
Russian terms, he would act alone to protect the Christian populations of the Balkans.11 Great 
Britain called for a conference that under international law should have included the Ottomans. 
Their exclusion led the Ottomans to believe that the Great Powers were trying to isolate them in 
the international arena.12 The Conference began on December 23, 1876, but did not last long 
because the Ottoman government rejected several of its proposals.13 From the outset, Ottoman 
leadership insisted that the European Powers adhere to the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris and 
not, in any way, infringe upon the independence of the Empire's Balkan administration. When 
European delegates adopted a program that essentially disbanded Ottoman authority in Bosnia 
and Bulgaria, the government saw a clear violation of the Empire’s territorial integrity. 
According to Safvet Paşa, the Ottoman Foreign Minister (1876-77), this proposal gave executive 
and judicial powers, as well as control of the army, to foreign powers in Bosnia and Bulgaria.14 
The Great Powers also assumed the right to participate in the election of Ottoman governors and 
to establish an international commission to oversee and execute the regulations of the provincial 
administration. Safvet Paşa was acutely aware that these demands would effectively remove 
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Ottoman sovereignty and formally sanction the separation of Bosnia and Bulgaria from the 
Empire.15  The Ottoman government ultimately had no opportunity to negotiate a different 
outcome because they were not invited to the conference. They ultimately agreed to demands for 
a new provincial administration that would govern without distinction to religion, language, and 
creed because these rights were already guaranteed by the Ottoman Constitution of 1876.16 But 
they were unwilling to accept others that violated the egalitarian spirit of the Constitution by 
according special rights to Christians only.  
 On the February 20, 1877, the Ottoman Empire and Serbia signed an armistice. The 
Sultan's Imperial Decree on the "Re-Establishment of Peace with Servia" reaffirmed the status 
quo ante with no change in borders and mutual recognition of only nominal Ottoman sovereignty 
over the semi-autonomous Serbia.17 While the potential for war between Russia and the Ottoman 
Empire still loomed, the Great Powers met in London to resolve the humanitarian crisis in 
Bulgaria. The Powers declared that their agents in the Empire would watch carefully to ensure 
that the Ottoman government was keeping its guarantees to protect the Christian subjects.18 
 This series of events is illuminating for several reasons. The Great Powers excluded the 
Ottoman government from a conference pertaining to matters of the Empire’s vital interests, 
which was in direct contravention to the rules of the Concert of Europe and the Treaty of Paris. 
The Ottoman government rejected proposals that breached the terms of the Treaty of Paris. They 
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did agree, however, to measures for the protection of their population that did not contravene 
Ottoman authority or the spirit of their Constitution. At the end of the Conference, European 
Powers issued the London Protocol that authorized its members to ensure that improvement was 
forthcoming for Ottoman Christians. If not, then they would consider more severe action. Both 
the Ottoman and British governments understood that if the Ottoman Constitution produced 
positive results for the Christian communities then no further action would be needed.19 The 
Great Powers’ decision to disregard the Treaty of Paris and interfere in Ottoman domestic 
administration proved to the Ottomans that they would not receive the same treatment as other 
European states, they would not be consulted on matters of vital interests, and, ultimately, they 
were considered non-civilized and in need of tutelage. 
 The Russians were not willing to wait for the Ottoman Constitution to improve 
conditions for the Christian community.20 Under the pretext that the Ottomans refused to abide 
by the demands of the London Protocol, Russia declared war in April of 1877.21 The Ottomans 
countered on April 24 that, in fact, they had agreed to all the essential parts of the reforms and 
that Russia’s declaration of war was without justification or the sanction of the Concert.22 The 
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Ottomans repeatedly demanded mediation.23 They were not alone in viewing the Russian 
declaration of war as a breach of the Treaty of Paris. The British government found Ottoman 
assurances sufficient and disapproved of Russia's war initiative. They condemned the Russians, 
stating, 
the course on which the Russian government has entered involves graver and more 
serious considerations. It is in contravention of the stipulation of the Treaty of Paris..., by 
which Russia and the other signatory Powers engaged, each on its own part, to respect the 
independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire...In taking action against Turkey on 
his own part, and having recourse to arms without further consultation with his allies, the 
Emperor of Russia has separated himself from the European concert hitherto 
maintained...24 
 
British support was meaningless, however, because in the end they were more concerned with 
their own strategic interests. On May 6, 1877, the British assured the Russians that they would 
not offer assistance to the Ottomans as long as the Russians did not invade the Persian Gulf, 
Constantinople, and Egypt.25 They kept this promise because their aid to the Ottomans never 
materialized throughout the war.26  
The Ottomans suffered greatly due to the Russian attack and Britain’s failure to supply 
assistance. The Russian-Ottoman War of 1877-78 was a disaster for the Ottoman Empire. They 
lost eight percent of their richest and most productive territory and twenty percent of their 
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population to foreign control.27 The new borders, which were now limited to a small buffer zone 
around Constantinople with a narrow corridor leading to Macedonia and Albania, were difficult 
to defend against invasion.28 
 The Concert of Europe had admitted the Ottoman Empire into its ranks, but had refused 
to accept its full integration. This was in large part due to the European perception that as an 
Islamic state the Ottomans could not achieve the highest levels of civilization reserved for 
Christian powers. As a non-civilized state, the Ottomans could not be truly sovereign and were 
thus excluded from the protection of international law. The Russian-Ottoman War of 1877-78 
also demonstrated that the European Powers were unwilling to accept the Ottomans as a full 
member despite their reform program. The Great Powers refused the Ottomans the same 
privileges allotted other member states and did not protect their territorial integrity and 
independence. When Russia justified war by claiming to be protecting Ottoman Christians, the 
Great Powers quickly abandoned their guarantees and, instead, demanded reforms that were 
already in place and other concessions that limited Ottoman sovereignty. The inability of the 
Europeans to accept the Ottoman Empire as a state of equal status was to lead to disastrous 
results. As will be shown in the following chapter, the Ottomans now understood that the Great 
Powers, and Great Britain in particular, were no longer allies and their membership in the 
Concert of Europe would not guarantee territorial integrity and sovereignty. This realization was 
the genesis of the fatal decision made in 1914 to align with Germany in the First World War.
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Chapter II: The Diplomatic Implications of the Russian-Ottoman War of 1877-78 
 Revolution and war plagued the Ottoman Empire's European territories in the 1870s. 
There was an ongoing revolt in Bosnia, and war was developing in the western Balkans between 
the Ottomans and a Serbian-Montenegrin alliance. Bulgarian nationalists took advantage of this 
instability and began an insurrection in central Bulgaria that was met with violence by Ottoman 
irregulars. Europeans would name these revolts across Ottoman Rumelia the "Bulgarian 
Horrors."   
 This chapter will begin with an examination of the reasons why the British did not uphold 
their obligations under the Treaty of Paris to support the Ottomans against these insurgencies. It 
will show that British assistance became impossible due to growing anti-Ottoman public opinion; 
that the British were unwilling to uphold its guarantees to protect the Empire’s territorial 
integrity and independence; and that these decisions were based on an evolution of the meaning 
of citizenship that excluded the Ottomans. 
 It moves to a study of the Ottoman explanation of the reasons for the Bulgarian revolts 
and the failure of the Concert of Europe to prevent Russia from unilaterally acting to end the 
rebellion by declaring war on the Empire. This research will show that the Ottomans believed the 
insurgencies were propelled by foreign agitators who sought to undermine the social stability of 
the region in order to sever the Balkans from the Empire. Against growing separatist 
nationalisms, however, Ottoman statesmen believed that they could restore order if they adhered 
to the principles of civic Ottomanism and appealed to their subjects’ sense of shared community 
in one homeland.  
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 The final section of this chapter will look at Ottoman decision-making after the Russian-
Ottoman War of 1877-78, which led to a new foreign policy that recognized the costs to the 
Empire’s territorial integrity from lack of British support and the failure of the international 
system. Well before 1914, Ottoman statesmen understood that Great Power politics and 
diplomacy alone were insufficient to guarantee the Empire’s security. 
The Bulgarian Horrors I: The Horrors and British Perceptions 
 The horrors of events in Bulgaria in 1877 were intentionally exaggerated by writers and 
journalists who ignored Muslim suffering and obscured the true nature of the revolt from the 
British public. British and Ottoman sources, however, reveal a more complicated picture of a 
region beset by the fear of religious violence and inter-ethnic reprisals that were provoked by 
revolutionary and foreign agitation. Also emerging from these sources is the continued 
dedication of Ottoman statesmen to the ideology of civic Ottomanism and the sentiments of the 
Hatt-ı Şerif-i Gülhane and Hatt-ı Hümayun in the face of the collapse of their imperial system in 
Bulgaria. 
 Richard Millman has noted that most of the scholarship in the twentieth century accepted 
accounts of large-scale massacres of Bulgarians that were estimated between 10,000 and 15,000 
deaths.1 In his groundbreaking 1980 article, Millman proved that this depiction was a myth 
formulated from unconfirmed reports by British agents and missionaries who openly spoke of 
their hatred of the Ottomans and made little effort to obtain accurate data.2 They were primarily 
concerned with the impact of the revolt on the Ottoman Christian population and did not look at 
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violence against Muslims.3 Importantly, Millman found that although the Pomaks (Bulgarian 
Muslims) and Başi Bazouks (Ottoman irregulars) were responsible for some atrocities, it was 
impossible to gauge from the available sources the extent and severity of these attacks.4 As a 
result, scholars could not know the full extent of the massacres.5      
 Justin McCarthy studied the insurrection from the perspective of Ottoman Muslims and 
found that in the beginning the Bulgarian revolution was a slaughter of Muslims.6 During the 
Serbian-Ottoman War of 1876, Bulgarian fighters perpetrated extreme acts of violence against 
Crimean-Circassian refugees who had been recently settled in Serbia and Bosnia.7 Bulgarian 
insurgents expected that burning Circassian villages would bring violent reprisals that would lead 
to a breakdown of order and potentially cause foreign intervention. 8 At the start of the revolt, 
only a small contingent of the Ottoman regular army aided by armed Circassian irregulars were 
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stationed in Bulgaria. 9 The Circassian irregulars were quick to oblige the revolutionaries; they 
perpetrated atrocities against Bulgarian Christian communities in revenge for Bulgarian attacks 
on Circassian villages. Despite this, the Ottoman regular army sought to limit the damage done to 
the civilian population by arresting and punishing the offending irregulars. McCarthy has 
concluded that the Bulgarian horrors were indeed a terrible and real Muslim reaction against 
insurrection, but the news that reached Europe was either inaccurate or highly exaggerated and 
sensationalized.10   
 Just two decades earlier, British public opinion had generally viewed the Ottomans in a 
positive light. News reports during the early 1850s noted that Ottoman reforms benefitted all 
Ottoman subjects. The new reforms limited the power of the religious establishment, granted its 
subjects equality, and ended the abuses perpetrated by Ottoman irregulars against the Empire's 
Christian population.11 Throughout the Crimean War the British media presented the Ottoman 
Empire as a rising power.12 In 1854, the Ottoman ambassador in London thanked the British 
people for publicly expressing their goodwill in the face of Russian aggression during the war. 13 
Not all reports were positive, however. In 1858 the Leader published an article stating that the 
Ottoman Empire could never become civilized and was destined to fall. The author bemoaned 
the fact that British public opinion believed the Empire could successfully reform itself, and that 
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only a few recognized the cultural limitations that would prevent successful regeneration. 14 By 
the mid-1870s, negative views of this sort predominated in the media. Even former supporters 
such as William Gladstone shifted his position. In 1875, Gladstone was arguing that the Ottoman 
system of checks and balances made them the least despotically governed state in the world.15 
One year later, he wrote a book asserting that Ottoman barbarism stemmed not only from Islam 
but also from the characteristics of the Turkish race:  
It is not a question of Mahometanism simply, but Mahometanism compounded with the 
peculiar character of a race…They were, upon the whole, from the black day when they 
first entered Europe, the one great anti-human specimen of humanity. Wherever they 
went, a broad line of blood marked the track behind them; and as far as their dominion 
reached, civilization disappeared from view. They represented everywhere government by 
force, as opposed to government by law…But although the Turk represented force as 
opposed to law, yet not even a government, of force can be maintained without the aid of 
an intellectual element, such as he did not possess. 16 
 
Gladstone’s views changed significantly that year because of reports of Ottoman atrocities 
against the Bulgarians. In his view, racial and religious factors prevented the Ottomans from 
becoming “civilized” and successfully administering the Empire. He believed reform was not an 
option as the Ottomans lacked the intellectual capacity to understand the rule of law.  
 In subsequent years, strong anti-Ottoman opinion dominated newspaper reports about 
Ottoman atrocities in Bulgaria. One journalist stated that the Bulgarian atrocities had opened the 
public's eyes to the tyranny of the "Turk," and the people would never again consent to fight for 
                         
14. "Turkey since the War".  
15. Henry Munro Butler-Johnstone, "Speech of Mr. Butler-Johnstone. House of Commons, February, 1876", VI:84, 
previously published in The Diplomatic Review 24, no. 2 (April 1876): 84-85. Mr. Butler-Johnson, a conservative 
party politician in British Parliament, stated before the House of Commons on 16 February 1876 that Gladstone's 
recent outrage against the despotic Ottoman state was a new development. 
16. W. E. Gladstone, Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East (New York: Lovell, Adam, Wesson & 
Company, 1876), 10-11.  
42 
 
the Ottomans who would "place again their intolerable yoke on the necks of their slave.”17 A 
writter for the same paper claimed that Ottoman actions against civilians were atrocities beyond 
question.18 Circassians and Ottoman irregulars, the main perpetrators of the crimes, did not spare 
Christian women and children, unlike Bosnian insurgents who did no harm to Muslims 
families.19 Reports graphically alleged that the Ottomans tossed around Christian heads in the 
marketplace, or sold the jaws and teeth of massacred Christians. 20 Bandits then delivered them in 
cases of five hundred to Paris where there was great demand for dentures.21 One writer concluded 
that "it is a disgusting reflection that persons on both sides of the channel are unconsciously 
wearing the teeth of the massacred and violated."22 In another article the British government was 
accused of inaction due to its prejudice against Orthodox Christians.23 It went even further to 
condemn the government’s material and moral support for the Ottomans during the Crimean 
War, which had led to two decades of suffering for millions of Orthodox Christians.  The author 
concluded, "God forbid that we shall repeat that blunder and crime [The Crimean War]."24 In 
their criticism of British policy, journalists alleged that the dispatch of several British ironclads to 
the Bosphorus showed a pro-Ottoman foreign policy that was enraging the British public.25 
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Special interest groups also started issuing statements and publishing articles that condemned the 
Ottomans and British policy. A resolution by the Women’s Peace and Arbitration Auxiliary of 
the South-Eastern District of London declared, 
That this meeting regards with deepest indignation and horror the atrocities committed by agents 
of the Turkish Government on the defenseless Christian population of Bulgaria and other parts of 
the Ottoman Empire, and desires to express its opinion that all self-interested policy on the part 
of the professedly Christian Powers of Europe should be abandoned for a prompt concerted 
action in order at once to put a stop to any further outrages, and to bring about a suspension of 
hostilities and an amicable settlement of the question, as also an improved condition of things 
socially throughout the nationalities comprising the Turkish Empire.26 
 
The message of the group's resolution was clear. Regardless of national self-interest, the nations 
of Europe should not support the Ottoman Empire because of its treatment of Christians.  
 Changes in British travel literature also reflected the shifts taking place in British public 
opinion. In 1850, Edmund Spencer accused the Ottoman government of being "a pure despotism" 
but argued Ottoman governance was "mild and paternal when equitably administered.” 27 
Irregular taxation, religious fanaticism, and prejudice among “castes” plagued Ottoman 
territory.28 Reforms could mitigate the ills of the Ottoman Empire through the creation of an 
independent aristocracy.29 Spencer stated, 
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However, in those days, nothing could withstand Osmanali enterprise and  preserving 
energy; they were not then the indolent, degenerate, tchibouque-smoking, coffee-bibbing 
race we find them; nor were their chiefs the effeminate inmates of the harem, better fitted 
for weaving a web of intrigue on the velvet  cushion of a divan, than taking a bold active 
part in the regeneration of a country.30  
 
The Empire's ability to govern effectively had declined over time but Spencer argued that there 
were still no cultural barriers toward reform.31 Rather, the Ottomans just needed to place the 
Office of the Sultan on a firmer foundation while removing him as the sole lord of the land.32 
Ottoman inferiority was not a permanent condition. In the past, the Empire had been properly 
administered and it could be again through reform programs such as the Tanzimat.  
 James Craegh traveled to Eastern Europe and the Balkans in 1875 where he observed that 
Ottoman Muslims were blindly religious and were poorly educated. They hated Christians and 
viewed any liberties granted to them as “a plot against the religion of Mahommed.”33 After the 
Ottomans had been pushed out of the Balkans, the large Muslim populations would face 
insurmountable difficulties because of their Islamic culture.34 He claimed, “owing to its large 
Mussulman population, Home Rule in Bosnia would be attended by insurmountable difficulties, 
compared to which a similar form in Ireland would be harmonious and edifying.”35 Creagh, 
unlike Spencer, did not see the possibility for change. In his view, not only poor administration 
but also Ottoman-Muslim culture prevented the Empire from achieving lasting order and 
stability. Reform was not a viable option to salvage the Empire.  
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 British agents in the Ottoman Empire examined the incoming reports from Eastern 
Rumelia through the lens of their own assumed cultural superiority. During the Bulgarian revolt 
Edward Stanley, the Foreign Secretary (1874-80) sent a communication to Sir H Elliot, the 
British Ambassador in Constantinople (1867-77), stating, "it is my duty to inform you that any 
sympathy which was previously felt here towards that country has been completely destroyed by 
the recent lamentable occurrences in Bulgaria."36 The Foreign Secretary stated that, although 
failure to aid the Ottoman Empire would be a humiliating breach in Britain's treaty arrangements, 
public opinion made such a humiliation likely.37  In his response, Ambassador Elliot wrote that 
"an insurrection or civil war is everywhere accompanied by cruelties and abominable excesses, 
and this being tenfold the case in Oriental countries, where people are divided into antagonistic 
creeds and races."38 Elliot continued that he did not have any sentimental affection for the 
"Turks" but he still felt it best for Great Britain to continue to support the Ottoman Empire as 
British interests aligned with its preservation.39 He concluded, 
We have been upholding what we know to be a semi-civilized nation, liable under certain 
circumstances to be carried into fearful excesses: but the fact of this having just now been 
strikingly brought home to us all cannot be a sufficient reason for abandoning a policy 
which is the only one that can be followed with a due regard to our own interests.40  
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Elliot accepted accounts of Ottoman atrocities as a predictable outcome of Ottoman “barbarism.” 
The British should expect “barbaric” acts from states lying outside the pale of civilization and 
these atrocities should have no bearing on British strategic interests.   
 Even those in Britain who supported the Ottoman Empire viewed them through the lens 
of a world divided between civilized and non-civilized states. Sir Edward Sullivan, a liberal 
member of Parliament (1865-70) and Lord Chancellor of Ireland (1883-85), protested against 
British indignation over the Bulgarian Horrors, demonstrating how ingrained the concept of 
civilization was to the British worldview. He criticized Gladstone for not waiting for accurate 
reports and instead blindly reproducing the most exaggerated accounts.41 Sullivan’s imperial 
worldview was evident when he admitted that Gladstone had not taken into account the "semi-
barbarous nature of the combatants."42 Nevertheless, he defended the Ottomans who were forced 
to suppress a revolt created by Russian agitation, and to quash the violence perpetrated by 
Christians who with Russian encouragement were roasting Turkish officials alive and burning 
down villages.43 His defense of the Ottomans noted improvements in governance over the past 
twenty years, but it was tempered by the need for further progress and the fact that they remained 
a semi-barbarous people.44   
 In the 1850s, British media had by and large portrayed the Ottoman Empire as possessing 
the ability to reform and become a rising power. By the 1870s, however, highly exaggerated and 
outrageous reports coupled with the changing conceptualization of civilization in Europe 
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convinced many in Great Britain that reform was impossible. As far as the British were 
concerned, the Ottoman Empire was destined to fall.  
The Bulgarian Horrors II: The Ottoman Interpretation 
 Public outrage in Great Britain made a British-Ottoman defensive alliance impossible. 
Despite this, the British sent Walter Baring, the second secretary at the British embassy in 
Constantinople, to investigate the accuracy of the alleged atrocities.45 Baring found many of the 
allegations against the Ottomans presented in earlier reports to be pure fabrication.46 He also 
discovered that the Bulgarian revolutionaries had intended to destroy Muslim villages, 
exterminate all Muslims within the region, and burn the Christian villages that did not join their 
cause.47 Overall, Baring estimated that the Ottoman irregulars massacred twelve thousand 
Christians, but he noted that these estimates were unreliable and, as a result, his numbers were 
open to correction.48 
 The Ottoman account of the rebellion differs significantly. Their reports portrayed 
Ottoman subjects as the victims of a malicious revolutionary movement that was spreading fear 
and inter-communal conflict, and perpetrating massacres throughout the region. One important 
event illustrates Bulgarian atrocities. When the local council in Philippopolis (Plovdiv) became 
aware of an insurrection, they sent a Lieutenant of the Ottoman Gendarme, Nedjib Agha, to arrest 
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leading members of the revolutionary committee who were based in the central Bulgarian town 
of Avrat-Alan.49 On May 2, 1876, Nedjib Agha arrested two prominent revolutionaries, 
Dochtessaly Teodor and Thosson Yorghi, which prompted the revolutionary committee to lay 
siege to the governor’s house in order to free the prisoners. Nedjib Agha released the prisoners, 
but he would not surrender. The siege lasted ten hours, until Nedjib Agha was able to escape and 
flee.50 The insurgents massacred several Muslims in the town, as well as the remaining Ottoman 
gendarmes, and seized control of the region.51 A detachment of insurgents linked up with rebels 
in the district of Yeni-Keui, where they massacred and tortured twenty-eight Muslims and 
transported fifteen gypsy families to Avrat-Alan, ordering them to join local gypsies in forced 
labor.52 According to Ottoman accounts, insurgents tortured and massacred about one hundred 
Muslims and gypsies in the area of Avrat-Alan.53 
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 Following these events, bands of Bulgarian insurgents spread throughout the region 
telling the inhabitants that the Muslims were planning to exterminate all Christians.54 They 
compelled the Bulgarian Christians to have their families flee into the safety of the Balkan 
Mountains. Every able-bodied man was to remain behind, take up arms, and join the rebels.55 
Ottoman reports stated that the leadership of the rebellion instructed the insurgents to strike fear 
into the population by massacring Muslims and burning their villages.56 The revolutionaries 
assured the Christians that Russia would send chests of gold to indemnify them should their 
houses and villages be destroyed.57 The Ottomans claimed that false reports that exaggerated the 
violence had spread among the population and exacerbated the situation.58 Chakir Bey, an 
imperial commissioner traveling in the Danube province, discovered that Bulgarian Muslims 
were now arming themselves after receiving news that bands of Christian insurgents were 
massacring Muslims.59 He stated that the Muslims had "lost all confidence, even towards the 
Christians with whom they were on good terms."60 Muslim reprisals quickly followed. 
Bulgarians who had not taken part in the revolt suffered as a result.61 Ali Suavi, an activist and 
reformer who held administrative positions in Ottoman Rumelia, believed that the insurrections 
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had been caused by foreign agitators and not by local discontent.62 Ottoman officials had tried to 
convince local Christian leaders that the reports were fabrications, that they had all lived together 
as brothers for centuries, and that they had no intention of exterminating the Christian 
population.63   
 The prominent position of civic Ottomanism can be seen when Ali Suavi dismissed 
French statements that Orthodox Christians in the Balkans naturally identified more strongly 
with Slavic and Russian nationalisms.64 Suavi believed that it was inappropriate to equate 
religion with nationalism.65 The Christians of the Balkans belonged to one nation, the Ottoman 
nation.66 As far as Suavi was concerned, the principle of civic Ottomanism, which did not 
differentiate on the basis of religion, had the power to guarantee security and save the Empire.67 
Ottoman statesmen adhered to this principle throughout the Bulgarian crisis and used it to 
legitimize Ottoman rule of the Balkans. The people of the Balkans were Ottoman nationals and 
regardless of religion this was the core of their identity.  
The Extraordinary Tribunal, an official Ottoman commission set up in Philippopolis to 
monitor and suppress the Bulgarian revolt, also stressed the importance and effectiveness of civic 
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Ottomanism. The Tribunal’s report stated that before the insurrection Ottoman Christians and 
Muslims had lived together in good fellowship under the protection of the government.68 Chakir 
Bey’s belief in civic Ottomanism was evident when he spoke to the Christian and Muslim 
communities in the villages that had experienced agitation but had not been sites of full 
rebellion.69 He told the Muslims that it was the sincerest wish of the imperial government for the 
Christians and Muslims to work together to achieve communal happiness. Speaking to the 
Christians, Chakir Bey emphasized that foreign instigations were responsible for endangering the 
country and, by extension, their community. They were "all children of the same country, and 
that they themselves constituted one of its chief elements of grandeur and prosperity."70 Every 
Ottoman would benefit from abandoning the mistrust that had taken hold in their communities 
and living in harmony with their fellow countrymen.71  
 Ottoman reports also demonstrated how officials used loyalty to the dynasty, the basis of 
civic Ottomanism, in order to create inter-religious alliances of Ottoman citizens for mutual 
defense and the restoration of order in the Balkans.72 They were able to relieve besieged towns 
and assist the local population by providing security. From the Ottoman perspective, loyalty to 
the dynasty was being threatened by outside agitators, but civic Ottomanism could still be an 
effective policy in providing inter-religious dialogue and security to the villages.  
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 The Ottomans perceived the revolt as the product of revolutionary leaders encouraged by 
foreigners who spread fear throughout the region and caused the breakdown of Ottoman society. 
Holding true to the ideals of civic Ottomanism, Ottoman accounts portrayed these communities 
as having been united in brotherhood in the past, and this sense of community could calm the 
fears that had taken hold of the region. Reports highlighted successes in areas where imperial 
officials arrived before insurgents burnt down the villages. Against this backdrop, Ottoman 
statesmen would constantly appeal to Great Power assurances of support for their territorial 
integrity as stipulated in the Treaty of Paris and request assistance for their war against Russia. 
The refusal of the Great Powers, and Britain in particular, to uphold their obligations would lead 
to Ottoman protests and ultimately a rethinking of their foreign alignments. 
Ottoman Reflection and a New Foreign Policy 
 The Ottoman state risked war with Russia in 1877 because they expected British support 
and doubted that the Russians could mount a successful campaign.73 They firmly believed Great 
Britain would uphold the guarantees of the Treaty of Paris and at the very least provide financial 
support. They also operated under the assumption that Russia was unprepared for a military 
operation against the Empire.74 For these reasons, Ottoman leadership rejected all Russian 
demands for reforms that they viewed as impinging on their sovereignty. Mehmet Safvet Paşa, 
the Foreign Minister (1876-77), wrote a report after the Russian-Ottoman War that explained the 
events that had led to this conflict.75 Safvet Paşa assessed the causes and concluded that the 
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Ottoman leadership was too fatalistic in accepting the inevitability of war. The Ottomans were 
over confident in both their military strength and in the guarantees of foreign powers.76 Before 
the war, the Ottomans had expected that Russophobia in Great Britain would resurface.77 Indeed, 
as the Russian armies crossed the Danube in 1877 Abdülhamid II counted on British support, and 
the Sultan held this expectation throughout the war.78 When the Ottomans pressured the British 
for assistance they relented a little by agreeing to send two ironclads into the Sea of Marmara, but 
still refused any direct military or financial involvement.79 Safvet's report suggested that the 
Empire should not tie itself into an exclusive alliance.80  
 After the war, Abdülhamid II commissioned several reports in anticipation of drafting a 
new foreign policy. Hayreddin Paşa, the Grand Vizier in 1878 who was well respected by the 
Sultan, wrote several recommendations.81 He suggested an alliance with a newly unified 
Germany, which was naturally the strongest power in Europe. In his opinion, the internal affairs 
of other powers were in disorder and they no longer saw the Ottomans as a buffer to Russia.82 
Hayreddin Paşa also recommended internal reform but, unlike Safvet Paşa, he believed that the 
Empire needed to secure an alliance with a Great Power.  
 Hayreddin Paşa and Safvet Paşa were products of the early Tanzimat era's assertion that 
security rested with internal reform and acceptance into the European international system. The 
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perspective of the younger generation of officials differed significantly.83 Kȕçȕk Mehmet Said 
Paşa, head of the Sultan's palace secretariat from 1876 through 1878 and Grand Vizier in 1879, 
presented Abdülhamid II with a report in which he argued that as long as the Empire was weak 
no Great Power, including Germany, could be trusted. In his opinion, the Empire should combine 
good government at home with skillful diplomacy abroad, thus giving no justification for 
intervention. After Britain occupied Egypt in 1882, Kȕçȕk Mehmet Said Paşa realized that no 
amount of internal reform would secure the Empire; this could only be achieved with a Great 
Power alliance. Kıbrıslı Mehmet Kamil Paşa, who would eventually serve three times as Grand 
Vizier, countered that territorial guarantees from the European powers offered no real security. 
The Great Powers acted exclusively out of self-interest and as a result, the Ottoman Empire must 
rely only on its own diplomatic skill and military power.84  
 Abdülhamid II did not fully adopt these recommendations in his new foreign policy.85 He 
believed that maintaining European peace was vital to Ottoman security and making an exclusive 
alliance with any European power could potentially provoke a European war. The Sultan also 
dismissed a Russian-Ottoman or British-Ottoman alliance. He understood that in order to remain 
entirely independent from the European powers he could not make an alliance with a power who 
held Christian clients within the Empire. A country with religious attachments to Ottoman 
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subjects might attempt to force internal reforms on the Empire, thereby turning the Ottomans into 
a de facto protectorate. Abdülhamid II resolved to cultivate a close relationship only with 
Germany because it had no designs on Ottoman territory and had no Christian clients within the 
Empire. Germany was also strong enough to restrain Ottoman rivals (Great Britain, Russia, and 
Austria-Hungary).86  
 As the century progressed, some Ottomans began to perceive the European powers as 
actively working together against Ottoman interests.87 Halil Halid, who had lived in London and 
was an expert on the shifting political climate in Europe, later reflected on Ottoman 
disillusionment with the European imperial powers who justified their territorial expansion 
through their "civilizing mission" and portrayed imperialism as humanitarian in aim and scope.88 
Halid pointed out that this civilizing mission only enriched the imperial powers while destroying 
the indigenous population who were not considered a part of the civilized Christian world.89 
Ottoman territories faced continuous assaults from European powers that made it "the perpetual 
victim of the diplomatic tomfoolery of the European Concert."90 Halid knew that the Ottoman 
Empire would never be accepted as a full member of the international system because Europeans 
did not consider them “civilized,” so the Empire must be the stalwart defender against 
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imperialism.91 As such, diplomatic agreements were meaningless because they served only 
European imperial ambitions. These agreements could not be trusted. Halid’s analysis reflected 
the transition in Ottoman statescraft from belief in the international system at the time of the 
Russian-Ottoman War to disillusionment in European guarantees by the early twentieth century. 
The events leading up to the Russian-Ottoman War, the injustices in the Russian invasion, and 
the failure of Great Britain to uphold its agreements were instrumental in pushing the Ottomans 
away from a reliance on the international system. The Ottomans understood that the Bulgarian 
revolt and the accompanying Russian intervention were intended to destroy their authority in the 
Balkans. They were justified in resisting Russian demands and insisting that Britain uphold her 
security commitments under the Treaty of Paris. Ottoman faith in the international system 
dissipated as a result of the pressures from Russian imperialism and the failures of European 
guarantees. The Russian-Ottoman war was a pivotal event that demonstrated the futility of trying 
to work within the international system. The consequences of having no international support 
would prove catastrophic. 
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Chapter III: Refugees and Ethnic Cleansing, 1877 to 1914 
 The Russian-Ottoman War of 1877-78 ended Ottoman hopes of sustained security 
through diplomacy. The war and ensuing refugee crisis also prompted the Ottoman elite to 
gradually abandon the principle of civic Ottomanism in favor of Islamic Ottomanism. The Young 
Turk Revolution of 1908 reversed this trend but the brutality of the Balkan Wars (1912-13) 
prompted the CUP to rethink the viability of a multicultural and multireligious state. Refugee 
crises, ethnic cleansing, the fate of the Empire and Ottoman Muslim lives, coupled with a 
changing ideology of the ruling elite, pushed the Ottomans into the First World War. 
Ethnic Cleansing and Refugee Crisis, 1877 to 1881 
 In addition to convincing Ottoman statesmen that diplomacy could offer no lasting 
security, the Russian-Ottoman War of 1877-78 led to the first major instance of ethnic cleansing 
in the Ottoman Balkans. Bulgaria and Russia perpetrated attacks against Ottoman Muslims 
during and after the war, which caused their mass exodus from the occupied territories. 
Following the refugee crisis, Abdülhamid II’s government adopted a new form of Ottomanism 
centered on Islamic symbolism in response to the influx of Muslim refugees, in order to 
emphasize the state’s legitimacy in the wake of competing nationalisms. 
 The mass migrations prompted by the Russian-Ottoman War were not the first mass 
population movements of the nineteenth century. During the Crimean War (1853-56) and in the 
following decade, hundreds of thousands of Crimean Tartars with historic links to the Ottoman 
Empire were branded as traitors and forced to flee Russia in search of Ottoman protection.1 
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Between 1859 and 1861, Russia embarked on a campaign to exert full imperial authority over the 
Caucasus that led to extermination and a migration of around 1.5 million Circassians.2 This 
migration was an unprecedented humanitarian disaster that led to death from disease, starvation, 
and exposure.3 In an attempt to mitigate this human tragedy, the Ottomans established the 
Refugee Commission (Muhacirin Komisyonu) in 1860 to regulate their resettlement. 4 The 
Refugee Commission acquired land for settlement in areas designated for economic 
development.5 This policy continued throughout the remaining years of the Empire and bore 
positive results.6 Refugee settlements benefited from the construction of railroads and were 
quickly transformed from camps into villages, and villages into towns.7  
The refugees who entered the Empire in the 1850s and 1860s did so from territories 
outside of Ottoman borders. They were Muslims fleeing persecution within Russia. In contrast, 
the refugee crises following the Russian-Ottoman War and the Balkan Wars took place within 
recently conquered Ottoman territories and followed the collapse of Ottoman imperial authority 
in the Balkans. After 1878, the Ottomans lost most of their Balkan territories (Bosnia, Bulgaria, 
and parts of Serbia and Montenegro) to Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, Austria-Hungary, and 
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Russia.8  As Ottoman imperial order collapsed, Russian and Bulgarian insurgents undertook 
campaigns of ethnic cleansing in the conquered territories. These events repeated themselves 
during 1913 when the Ottomans lost most of their remaining European territories (Albania, 
Macedonia, and Novi Pazar). 
During the Russian-Ottoman War, Muslim Turks and Bulgarians (Pomaks) were 
subjected to intentional, systematic slaughter, rape, and destruction of their villages. 9 Russian 
Cossacks were tasked by the Russian central command to coordinate with local Bulgarian 
revolutionaries and drive the Muslims from their homes.10 The goal was to form a larger, 
independent Bulgarian state through ethnic and religious cleansing. The Cossacks first 
surrounded Muslim villages, disarmed the population, and then sent in the Bulgarians to 
slaughter the population or to force them to flee in order to encumber the advancing Ottoman 
army.11  
The new Bulgarian state that was created by the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878 was 
controlled by the Bulgarian revolutionaries who had been responsible for the massacres of 
Ottoman Muslims.12 British Consuls in the region reported on various attempts by the new 
administration to eradicate their Muslim populations. Charles Brophy, the Vice-Council at 
Burgas, said they were prohibiting Muslims who had returned after the war from owning 
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property and were confiscating their goods and crops.13 R. Reade, the Consul at Varna, reported 
that many of the refugees who had initially survived the Bulgarian and Russian attacks had since 
died, but a group of 200,000 had managed to return to Shuma.14 The Russians refused to allow 
others to return home under the pretense that the Ottomans were not honoring the terms of the 
Treaty of San Stefano. The refugees in Shuma were in dire circumstances, having been subjected 
to starvation and famine. In desperation, some of them had tried to leave, but under Russian 
pressure Bulgarian insurgents attacked them, forcing their return to Shurma. Reade ended his 
account by stating that similar occurrences took place throughout Bulgaria and that the Russian 
army almost never attempted to prevent the maltreatment of Muslims.15  
British Consuls heard refugee reports of their harrowing plight. F.R.J. Calvert, Consul in 
Philippoplis, heard from Nazik, a 23 year-old Ottoman woman from central Bulgaria, whose 
story was representative of many refugees in 1878. Nazik, her family, and a group of around one 
hundred refugees arrived at Philippopolis in May of 1878 carrying safe-conduct documents from 
the Russian government.16 The Bulgarian authorities ignored the documents and forced the 
refugees to leave the town. Russian soldiers escorted the group as far as Yünkioi where the 
Bulgarian villagers locked them in a barn.  Later that day a priest led a mob into the barn, robbed 
and beat the refugees, tied up the men, and seized and raped the women. Nazik stated, “each man 
seized the first woman in his way, and dragged her into the fields and gardens around; they 
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ravaged every female of our party, down to girls of eight years.”17 Nazik was bedridden from 
disease and remained in the barn with her children. A woman near her had resisted the attack and 
during that struggle Nazik’s children were caught in the assault. Her oldest son was stabbed and 
died shortly thereafter and her other son was trampled and succumbed to his wounds a day later. 
The morning after the attack the Russian authorities forced Nazik’s group to walk to Beykioi 
where they would apparently be given residency. Some of the refugees who fell behind were 
murdered by the Bulgarians. Every week at Beykioi the Bulgarians inflicted the “worst 
indignities” upon the women and resistance only led to beatings. Nazik stated that “we have 
become like animals, and have forgotten what it is to feel shame.”18 Calvert added that the 
Bulgarian police at Philippopolis had arrested three Muslims who complained about the atrocities 
committed in Yünkioi.  
Nazik’s testament reflected many of the horrors faced by Ottoman Muslims in Bulgaria, 
most of whom were widows and children.19 Authorities rarely punished the perpetrators and 
those who were taken into custody received only light punishment.20 The Bulgarian government, 
in an effort to expel all Muslims, instituted a system of discrimination, degradation, and terror.21 
This intentional program of ethnic cleansing prompted the mass exodus of over 500,000 Muslims 
who subsequently sought refuge in the Ottoman Empire.22 In total, over seventeen percent, about 
261,937 Bulgarian Muslims, died as a result.23 In contrast to the Circassian refugees who had 
entered the Ottoman Empire in the 1860s, the Bulgarian Muslims were smaller in number, but 
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they were Ottoman subjects who suffered because of massive territorial losses and the 
breakdown of imperial order.  
For the Ottoman state, the refugee crisis did not end with the war. The process of 
resettlement was difficult and slow, causing many to die of disease and starvation.24 The refugees 
had suffered from an extreme culture of violence during the Russian and Bulgarian occupation. 
Even after they found permanent settlement, they contributed disproportionately to violent crimes 
in Istanbul and other areas, creating significant security problems for the Empire.25 The refugee 
crisis not only crippled the Empire’s economy but also invited a host of social problems that 
further strained the state.  
Ethnic cleansing and the ensuing refugee crisis drastically changed the demographic 
composition of the Empire. As a result of the influx of Bulgarian refugees and the erosion of 
state legitimacy in the face of rival nationalisms in the Balkans, Ottoman statesmen began to 
reflect on their policy of civic Ottomanism and rethink the identity of the Ottoman nation. Before 
the war, the Empire consisted of 21 million Muslims and 14 million Christians.26 After the war, 
the population declined as a result of territorial losses, and the ratios changed to 17.1 million 
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Muslims and 4.5 million Christians.27 The increase in the percentage of Muslims to Christians 
was one of the reasons that Ottoman officials began to emphasize the Islamic character of the 
Empire. Ottoman defeat in 1878 also weakened its legitimacy on the periphery of the Empire and 
forced the elites to seek a new basis for legitimacy. Military and political weakness following the 
war gave various nationalists across the Empire the opportunity to assert claims for independence 
along the lines of ethnic and religious sovereignty.28 Immediately after the war, for example, 
Armenians and Albanians demanded political autonomy and, when the Ottomans refused, they 
formed nationalist organizations with the goal of complete independence. Defeat not only shifted 
the Empire’s demographics but threatened imperial control and legitimacy. 
To combat the contested legitimacy of the state the Ottomans incorporated Islamic 
identity into the framework of Ottomanism. Statesmen now presented the Empire as the savior of 
the worldwide Muslim community because it was the last independent Islamic state. Rather than 
focusing on citizenship and the legal principles of nationhood that had been enshrined in the 
Tanzimat Reforms, Ottoman elites emphasized Islam as the cultural glue of society. Islam also 
provided a common bond to unite and better integrate the multicultural and multilingual refugees 
flooding into the Empire.29 Islamic symbols gave the Ottoman state a way to compete with the 
symbols presented by opposing Ottoman Greek and Serbia nationalisms.30 Abdülhamid II 
pursued policies throughout his reign that were intended to strengthen this newly envisioned 
Islamist Ottoman nationalism. He built the Hejaz railway, invested in the holy sites of Mecca and 
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Medina, constructed schools that emphasized Islamic nationalism, and provided financial support 
to Islamic cultural institutions.31 The Empire’s link to Islam was also strengthened by the Sultan 
who emphasized his role as the Sunni Caliph.32 The refugee crisis and Ottoman defeat in 1878 
prompted significant changes in the reconceptualization of the Ottoman state.   
Reform and Revolution, 1881-1911 
Abdülhamid II’s incorporation of Islamic Ottomanism into official policy did not erase 
civic Ottomanism. Both ideologies existed in tandem throughout the reign of Abdülhamid II as 
the Empire tried to come to terms with the changing demographics and tried to preserve imperial 
institutions. Either nationalism was used when it best suited the Empire’s needs and neither 
ideology was exclusivist. Islamic Ottomanism did not entirely exclude non-Muslims from the 
Ottoman polity, and universalist articulations of Ottomanism remained a way to reconcile the 
multicultural, multireligious nature of the Empire. In 1909, however, when the CUP overthrew 
Abdülhamid II, civic Ottomanism achieved new vitality, albeit briefly. The CUP stressed 
imperial laws and citizenship to advance a universalist conception where all Ottoman subjects 
were equal regardless of religion, language, or culture.33   
The period between 1878 and 1908 was, with a few exceptions, one of relative peace for 
the Ottoman Empire. In the 1890s, the Ottomans fought a war with Greece that lasted only thirty 
days and ended in Ottoman victory.34 The war prompted almost no changes to the borders 
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because the British and Russian governments refused to allow the Ottomans to gain any territory 
at the expense of a Christian state.35 The Ottomans did force the Greeks to pay a war indemnity 
and to allow Muslims living in the Greek state to migrate to Anatolia.36 The European response 
to Ottoman victory demonstrates the impossible situation of the Empire in the last half-century of 
its existence. The European powers were unwilling to interfere to protect Ottoman territory but 
were quick to intervene to prevent Ottoman territorial gains. Even in victory, the Ottomans 
accepted more Muslim refugees who would otherwise be forced to live in hostile states.  
Dissatisfied with the rule of Abdülhamid II, students from the imperial colleges and 
young officers led a revolution that brought the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) to 
power. 37 These revolutionaries proclaimed “liberty, equality, fraternity, and justice” for all 
citizens.38 At the beginning, they emphasized civic Ottomanism as a remedy to the earlier ethnic 
and religious conflicts, which they blamed on the tyranny of the old regime and on outside 
agitators who supported separatism.39 The return to civic Ottomanism was seen as a way to 
strengthen loyalty and inject new vitality into imperial life.  
Two wars threw the Empire into chaos shortly after the Young Turk Revolution. In 1911, 
Italy declared war with the goal of conquering Tripoli in North Africa. The Balkan states of 
Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece put aside their differences and took advantage of 
Ottoman weakness during the Tripoli War by entering into an alliance (The Balkan League).40 
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The Balkan League then declared war in October 1912 and quickly defeated the Empire’s armies, 
reducing Ottoman territory in Europe to a tiny strip of land surrounding Istanbul. 41 These two 
conflicts showed the weakness of civic Ottomanism as a unifying ideology and began a gradual 
movement towards Turkish nationalism among Ottoman elites.  
Ethnic Cleansing and Refugee Crisis, 1912-13 
 The Balkan Wars robbed the Ottomans of almost all European territory and prompted a 
new cycle of mass population movements and ethnic cleansing. At the start of the First Balkan 
War, the Ottomans controlled Macedonia, Albania, Novi Pazar, and Thrace. They lost most of 
these territories in the war, which led to new refugee movements into Ottoman Anatolia. 
Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian nationalist guerrilla bands (Komitajis) who were supported by 
their respective states exterminated Ottoman Muslims throughout 1912 and 1913.42 The mortality 
rates were enormous. Prior to the war, 2,315,293 Muslims lived in the Ottoman Balkans. By the 
end of 1913, 632,408 Muslims had perished and 413,922 refugees had fled into the Ottoman 
state.43  
 The invading armies and Christian population viewed the Balkan Wars as a social 
revolution in which the Christians would become masters over their Muslim overlords.44 Armies 
and guerillas systematically burned Muslim villages leaving thousands of homeless and starving 
refugees on the streets of Monastir, Salonica, and Uskub.45 A Carnegie Commission report 
concerning an incident in Strumnitsa, a town in northwest Macedonia with a mixed occupation 
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force of Bulgarians and Serbians, is indicative of the atrocities perpetrated during the wars. Major 
Grbits, a Serbian commander, Nicholas Voultchev, a Bulgarian lieutenant, Tchekov, the leader of 
the Bulgarian insurgents, and notable inhabitants of the town formed a temporary governing 
commission that disarmed all Muslims and summoned them to stand trial. The Muslims had no 
right to counsel nor to mount a defense, and judges who were locals and hardly impartial could 
condemn them to death. Nine out of ten defendants were found guilty, tortured and executed. 
Because of the Serbian involvement in Strumnitsa, the Bulgarian government could deny 
culpability. Their involvement in other atrocities was clearer, however. In Serres, a city in 
southern Macedonia, Bulgarian armed forces and irregulars slaughtered and raped over two-
hundred Greek Christians and Turkish Muslims.46 This event was representative of Balkan 
League techniques that used mass rape to shame Muslim women and force families to flee.47 In 
the case of Serras, although the Komitajis perpetrated most of the atrocities, the Bulgarian 
administration and army were complicit because they chose not to stop them.48 The Bulgarian 
Holy Synod, the highest religious authority, was also implicated in these crimes because they 
urged the government to forcibly convert the Pomaks remaining in Bulgarian territory.49  
 Muslim neighborhoods in towns throughout Thrace suffered greatly under Bulgarian 
occupation. In the town of Havsa, for example, the Bulgarian army burnt down their quarter, and 
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desecrated their mosques and graves.50 Pierre Loti, a member of the Carnegie Commission, 
visited the town and found that either the Bulgarians or local population destroyed Qur’ans, 
defecated in the mosque, broke headstones, and dug up at least one grave.51 Similar fates befell 
other villages in Thrace such as Has-Keuï, Souyoutli-dere, and Iskander-Keuï.52 When the 
Bulgarians retreated in the Second Balkan War, Ottoman Muslim civilians and Kurdish and Arab 
mounted irregular forces exacted revenge on Bulgarian villages.53 They had seen the horrors of 
Bulgarian occupation and in return indiscriminately punished the population by burning down the 
Christian quarters and murdering much of the population.54  
The costs of the Balkan Wars, the loss of territory, the mass influx of refugees, and the 
crippled economy forced Ottoman officials to reconsider the value of civic Ottomanism, which 
they held responsible for the quick Ottoman defeat in the First Balkan War. 55 Civic Ottomanism, 
which had established equality for all subjects, had led to the conscription of non-Muslims into 
the army.56 Their loyalty was tested for the first time in the Balkan Wars when they were forced 
to fight against Christian armies. Many had failed the test when they defected. Ottoman leaders 
concluded that they could not rely on non-Muslims and that civic Ottomanism was a failed 
policy.57 Ahmad Abuk Paşa, Field Marshal of the Ottoman Eastern Army, noted that the armies 
failed because the Empire had strayed from its Islamic character and lost the inherent virtues of 
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Islam.58 Some statesmen began to view Christians as the enemy and believed that the Empire’s 
Islamic identity should be emphasized in order to preserve the Empire and prevent collapse.  
The Ottoman Empire entered the First World War with a fractured national identity. 
Intellectuals began to discuss a new type of national identity based on Turkish ethnicity. Ziya 
Gökalp (1876-1924), the foundational thinker behind Turkism, argued that Turkish identity 
should become the primary character of the Ottoman Empire. These seeds of Turkish nationalism 
were sown by the Balkan Wars, which left a sense of victimhood among high-ranking CUP 
members such as Enver and Talaat Paşa.59 They had a severely weakened Empire surrounded by 
enemies in desire of retribution. 60 The CUP did not fully abandon civic Ottomanism as there was 
no alternative in 1913. 61 Nascent Turkish nationalism, pan-Islamic identities, and the imperial 
ideology of Ottomanism coexisted in the remaining few years of the Ottoman Empire’s 
existence. 
 The two major wars in 1877-78 and in 1912-13 had demonstrated to Ottoman statesmen 
that the loss of territory meant the extermination of Ottoman Muslims.62 These tragedies also 
revealed the failures of civic Ottomanism. Although civic Ottomanism and Islamic Ottomanism 
co-existed uncomfortably side by side, these cataclysmic events led Ottoman statesmen and 
intellectuals to begin to doubt the relevance of Ottomanism since Ottoman-Christians had 
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perpetrated many of the crimes. They now started to examine the possibilities of ethnic Turkish 
nationalism; however, by 1914 it was not a fully articulated and developed ideology.  
Statesmen crafting foreign policy in the year after the Balkan Wars were forced to ignore 
the principles of Ottomanism and address the more pressing concerns of the survival of the 
Empire and protection of its Muslim citizens. As the next chapter will show, the actions and 
words of the leadership reflect the total and inescapable fear of partition and extermination. The 
CUP concluded that the stakes of the next war were Ottoman survival. Regardless of Ottoman 
desires for peace, the Great Powers had already raised the ante through years of interference in 
the Balkans. 
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Chapter IV: 1914 
 During the July Crisis the Ottoman leadership formulated policies based on the 
experiences of the past half century. An analysis of their statements and diplomatic maneuverings 
reveals that ethnic cleansing in the Balkans coupled with the nature of the European diplomatic 
system prompted Ottoman statesmen to lead the Empire on a path toward war. The leading 
members of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) saw war as the only course to ensure 
the Empire’s survival.  
Refugees and Islam 
 The Russian-Ottoman War of 1877-78 and the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 left a lasting 
impact on the leaders of the CUP. Ethnic cleansing in the Balkans between 1878 and 1914 
framed the Empire’s enemies as crusaders seeking to drive Muslims out of Europe. The symbols 
used by the armies of the Balkan League cemented this perception among Ottoman leaders. The 
CUP saw the next war as a defensive struggle to ensure the survival of those who depended on it 
for security.  
 After witnessing the horrors of ethnic conflict in the Balkan Wars, Enver Paşa, the 
Minister of War from 1914 to 1918, described the actions of the Balkan League (Serbia, 
Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Greece) as the “latest crusade” and called upon the Ottomans to take 
revenge for the murder of innocent Muslims.1 Throughout the wars, Enver Paşa consistently tried 
to help Muslim relief efforts and showed his deepest appreciation and gratitude to aid coming 
from abroad, especially from India. Indian aid organizations came to the assistance of the 
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Ottomans because they feared that the last Islamic empire might collapse in the war. 2 Bitter over 
British occupation, Indian Muslims felt the “humiliation and shame of every Muslim” as the wars 
unfolded. 3 When Bulgarian armies approached within twenty-five miles of Constantinople, 
Maulana Mohamad Ali, the director of an Indian medical mission, considered suicide. 4 Ghulam 
Ahmad, a doctor in the mission, described a meeting with Enver Paşa: 
The whole Islamic world looked to him [Enver Paşa] to retrieve its lost honor and save 
the sinking ship of Turkey from utter destruction. We expressed a desire to kiss his hands 
for all Muslims of India and Hafizji had a regular tussle with him before he succeeded in 
kissing the tips of his fingers, which he returned by kissing him on the cheek.5 
 
At this point, the Ottoman armies had managed to retake some territory and Ahmad was 
reminding Enver Paşa of his importance to the world’s Muslims.  
Both the Russians and British reported on Muslim feelings of humiliation in 1914. 
Mikhail Nikolayevich von Giers, the Russian ambassador (1912-14), noted Ottoman feelings of 
humiliation after the Balkan Wars.6 He stated that Sultan Mehmed V (1909-18) and the army had 
released a manifesto that sought to rally the troops and wash away the shame and humiliation. 
Henry Arnold Cumberbatch, the British Consul-General in Beirut, observed that when the First 
                         
2. M. A. Ansari, "20 January 1913” Originally Published in Comrade. Appendix to People's Mission to the Ottoman 
Empire: M.A. Ansari and the Indian Medical Mission, 1912-13, by Burak Ançapar (New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), 257-58; and Ghulam Ahmad, "Comrade, 3 May 1913” Originally Published in Comrade. Appendix 
to People's Mission to the Ottoman Empire, by Burak Ançapar, 280-81; and Ansari, "11th to 20th February 1913” 
Originally Published in Comrade. Appendix to People's Mission to the Ottoman Empire, by Burak Ançapar, 270-71. 
Non-Muslims funded a medical mission to the Ottoman Empire between 1912 and 1913 to lessen the suffering 
created by the wars. One of the doctors Enver Paşa thanked was Dr. M.A. Ansari. Dr. Ansari while in the Ottoman 
Empire was also shown the caps of Bulgarian soldiers that were adorned with a rampant lion with a cross on its head 
who was trampling the crescent, which supported the Ottoman belief that attacks against Muslims were a Christian 
crusade. Prince Abdul Halim, the nephew of the Sultan, showed these caps to Dr. Ansari. 
3. Wasti, "The Circles of Maulana Mohamad Ali," 52-53.  
4. Ibid., 53.   
5. Ahmad, "Comrade, 3 May 1913” Originally Published in Comrade. Appendix to People's Mission to the Ottoman 
Empire, by Burak Ançapar, 280-81.   
73 
 
World War broke out, Muslims in Beirut rejoiced at the prospect that they could regain lost 
territory and secure the Empire’s future.7 In the Arab provinces there was fear that partition 
would lead to occupation by European powers, and in order to protect Muslim lives, preservation 
of the Ottoman Empire was the preferred outcome.   
The Ottoman purchase of two British battleships demonstrates the siege mentality that 
overtook both statesmen and the masses. Scholars such as David Fromkin and Sean McMeekin 
have pointed to the connection between their purchase and public outrage toward the Entente.8 
The Ottoman government had promised that the ships would lead to naval dominance in the 
Black and Aegean Seas, thus safeguarding the Empire from Greece and Russia.9 Millions of 
Muslims had paid for the ships by public subscription, and the British seizure caused tremendous 
public anger.10 This siege mentality led Ottoman policy makers to the realization that the Empire 
needed to immediately modernize its institutions. Said Halim Paşa, the Grand Vizier (1913-17), 
defined modernity as a state attainable by any culture that was tied to military, industrial, and 
political advances on a level comparable to the most developed countries in the world.11 He 
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believed that the Tanzimat Reforms with its emphasis on westernization had crippled the Empire. 
Modernity should be based on Islamic values, which would place the Muslim world on an equal 
footing with all civilizations and enable Muslims to contribute to global development. The racial 
and ethnic conflicts of the previous decades convinced Said Halim Paşa that western nationalism 
was a threat, and an emphasis on Islamic identity and values was the only viable alternative. Due 
to his worldview, Said Halim Paşa encouraged and approved of the pro-Islamic policies of high-
ranking members of the CUP such as Enver Paşa.12 The Balkan Wars and concurrent ethnic 
cleansing spurred on Islamist and anti-national discourses within the Ottoman Empire.  
 Mustafa Aksakal and Sean McMeekin have argued that the Ottomans entered the war due 
to a developing revanchist Turkish nationalism. This position is only partially correct. It fails to 
appropriately contend with the impact of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, while overstating the 
importance of Turkish nationalism. Their argument holds that after the Balkan Wars, the 
leadership and the public believed Great Power diplomacy could not offer security.13 When the 
army under Enver Paşa retook Edirne in 1913, this demonstrated to Ottoman statesmen that only 
military strength could preserve the Empire.14 Sean McMeekin adds that statesmen believed 
another war was inevitable and the Empire needed to regain strategic territories and protect Turks 
who were suffering under foreign control.15 They recognized that their military was weakened by 
the Balkan Wars and in 1914 began to seek an alliance with a great power.16 Germany proved to 
be the only power receptive to an alliance. The Ottomans could not afford to let the alliance 
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break apart, so when Germany issued an ultimatum demanding their participation in the war, they 
were forced to join the Central Powers.17 Thus, a developing Turkish nationalism informed 
Ottoman policy during the critical months between July and November 1914.18  McMeekin 
mentions Halil Bey, the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, to demonstrate that Turkish 
nationalism had overtaken the government. In May of 1914, Halil Bey admonished his fellow 
members of Parliament not to forget beautiful Rumelia and their “brothers and sisters who have 
remained on the other side of the borders and who must be saved.”19 Contrary to McMeekin’s 
assertion, Halil Bey does not mention Turks in the quote. The brothers and sisters he referenced 
were not only Turks but Pomaks, Circassians, and Albanians. He was expressing the sentiments 
of most of the leadership who desired to save Ottoman Muslims, more generally, from ethnic 
cleansing and to defend the Empire’s borders. Aksakal and McMeekin’s arguments, therefore, 
fail to account for the fact that in 1914 Ottoman statesmen were more likely civic or Islamic 
Ottomanists and did not strictly adhere to any form of Turkish nationalism. As shown above, the 
Grand Vizier Said Halim Paşa considered nationalism a western concept that was a threat to the 
integrity of the Empire. McMeekin suggests that in May of 1914 Halil Bey’s speech 
demonstrated the climate of Turkish nationalism, but Turkism was only beginning to emerge at 
the end of the Balkan Wars and the ideology did not become policy until 1917.20  
Between 1913 and 1914, high-ranking members of the Ottoman government were 
concerned with Muslim suffering and attaining lasting security for the Empire. The mass 
slaughter of Ottoman Muslims not only profoundly affected Enver Paşa and Said Halim Paşa but 
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also altered the political position of Talaat Paşa, the Minister of the Interior (1914-17).21 Talaat 
Paşa came to view the international system in terms of social Darwinism and believed that the 
Ottomans needed to fight for survival in a hostile international system or face extermination at 
the hands of their enemies.22 Ottoman leaders knew that a future war was inevitable and a great 
power alliance was necessary. 23 
Entente Diplomacy 
 An analysis of Entente-Ottoman diplomacy in 1914 reveals that the Entente Powers were 
not concerned with addressing Ottoman demands, but were cognizant of the Empire’s strategic 
position and desired to keep them neutral. First, the Ottomans controlled the Bosphorus Straits 
and its closure would deny the Entente Powers year-round access to Russia. Second, the 
Empire’s entrance into the war would require the Entente to move troops from Europe’s eastern 
and western fronts to protect Egypt and the Caucasus. Altay Cengizer and Feroz Ahmad have 
both argued that the British refused to give financial assistance to the Ottomans because they 
desired sturdier bonds with Russia, which they considered a stronger ally.24 In reality, 
communications between the Entente Powers reflect genuine concern over Ottoman neutrality 
and show that they did attempt to meet certain Ottoman demands. 
 German and Ottoman actions in the fall of 1914 further convinced the Entente that 
Ottoman neutrality was unlikely. In early August 1914, the Russians suspected that the Ottomans 
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intended to use the war to advance their own strategic interests at the expense of the Entente.25 
By the middle of the month, the British also began to suspect Ottoman duplicity when the 
German cruisers arrived in Constantinople.26 The Ottomans had not concealed their intentions to 
benefit from the war and, in fact, German ambassadors confirmed British suspicions by openly 
discussing German-Ottoman deceptions. The Germans had told the Greek ambassador in Berlin 
that the cruisers sold to the Ottomans were a false sale and were still owned by the Germans and 
staffed with a German crew.27 Greece was neutral and this revelation was intended to assuage 
their concerns over potential Ottoman naval superiority in the Aegean Sea. The Greeks reported 
this information to the Entente, which showed that the Ottomans had breached their neutrality by 
harboring German warships.28 The Ottoman government further exacerbated Entente suspicions 
by openly telling Great Britain and France that they could not trust the Russian guarantees.29 
British and French diplomats immediately passed this information to von Giers in 
Constantinople. The Ottomans then used the Great Powers’ preoccupation with the war to 
abolish the capitulations on August 27. This unilateral action drew condemnation from both the 
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Entente and Central Powers.30  
British-Ottoman relations further deteriorated when Talaat Paşa told Louis du Pan Mallet, 
the British Ambassador in Constantinople (1913-14), that the Empire would declare war if 
Greece did not surrender several Aegean islands.31 Mallet made the British position clear that a 
Greek-Ottoman war would not remain localized and would inevitably bring the Ottomans into 
conflict with the Entente, but he could not dissuade Talaat Paşa.32 By September 10, the Entente 
had discovered that the Germans were pressuring the Ottomans to fulfill their obligations under 
their alliance and join the war.33 From this point forward, the Entente knew that Ottoman 
leadership desired to end the capitulations and protect the Empire at any cost, including entering 
the war on the side of Germany. The Entente’s decision to distance itself from the Empire in 
1914 is not particularly surprising given Ottoman actions and deceits.  
Great Britain, France, and Russia still tried to keep the Ottomans neutral, despite their 
knowledge of Germans demands and Ottoman plans to use the war to negatively impact Entente 
interests. They knew from recent experience that Ottoman belligerency would adversely affect 
Russia’s war effort. During the Italian-Ottoman War (1911-12) they closed the Bosphorus Straits, 
which halted shipping that was essential to Russian industry, thereby causing a near collapse of 
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their economy.34 Although the Entente Powers knew that Ottoman interests conflicted with their 
own, they still sought to keep them neutral by offering concessions, such as the possibility of 
adjustments to the capitulations after the war, and guarantees of territorial integrity if they 
remained neutral.35   
By early September 1914, the Entente Powers knew that the Ottomans did not trust their 
guarantees and had already signed a secret treaty with Germany. Ahmad and Cengizer’s 
examination of the Entente’s role in pushing the Ottomans into the German camp is an attempt to 
correct older scholarship that depicted Ottoman leaders as opportunists who only desired 
territorial gain. They did not consider that the Entente did not trust the Ottomans, and that 
German and Ottoman actions provoked an antagonistic response. At the same time, the actions of 
Great Britain and Russia over the past few decades had already created an antagonistic 
relationship between the Ottomans and the Entente and, as such, Ottoman diplomacy in 1914 was 
almost certain to be skewed toward Germany.  
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Ottoman Diplomacy 
 The Entente Powers assumed correctly that the Ottomans intended to use the war for their 
own profit. The Ottomans had two choices: they could maintain neutrality or enter the war in 
alliance with Germany. Realistically, however, they had to form an alliance with Germany, which 
held the monopoly on armaments sales and was, almost certainly, going to ally with Bulgaria.36 
For this reason, neutrality or an alliance with the Entente was out of the question. If the 
Bulgarians entered the war on the German side, this would place the Central Powers within one 
hundred miles of Constantinople, exacerbating the logistical nightmare of abandoning German 
armament firms.37  
The Ottomans believed that the Entente intended to partition the Empire and they needed 
an alliance with Germany in order to guarantee their territorial integrity. Their concerns were 
confirmed when they intercepted Russian communications that discussed the Empire’s partition 
in the event of a German collapse. Even though the Entente continued to send guarantees to 
uphold the Empire’s territorial integrity and independence, the Russian communications and the 
past four decades of European double-dealing justified Ottoman distrust. An alliance with 
Germany and a victory, on the other hand, would strike a blow at Russia while securing them a 
much-needed period of peace.  
 By mid-summer 1914, at least two and a half months before entering the war, the CUP 
articulated its distrust when they told the British and French that they knew the Russians were 
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planning to partition the Empire.38 They demanded separate written pledges from each member 
of the Entente as an added assurance of their intentions to maintain Ottoman territorial 
integrity.39 On August 19, Cemal Paşa, the Minister of the Navy (1913-18), pressed the British to 
also make additional written guarantees that the Russians would not encroach on Ottoman 
territory.40 After the Ottomans abolished the capitulations they became even more concerned 
about Entente guarantees because they believed that the Powers were planning to reinstate them 
after the war. Talaat Paşa and Said Halim Paşa both expressed to von Giers on September 2 that 
they feared abolition of the capitulations would prompt military action from the Entente at the 
end of the war.41 A few days later, they also informed Sir Louis du Pan Mallet that they did not 
trust Entente guarantees. Mallet revealed British double-dealing when he expressed relief over 
Ottoman skepticism because “to guarantee [the] integrity and independence of Turkey was like 
guaranteeing [the] life of a man who was determined to commit suicide.”42 The historical record 
supports Ottoman assumptions that the British had no intention of maintaining its guarantees 
after the war. On September 23, Mallet wrote to the Foreign Office stating that they should 
accept Ottoman demands for the end of capitulations because it would “do much to calm [the] 
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Turks and keep them quiet during [this] critical period.”43 After the war there would be “so many 
means of putting pressure on [the] Turks” that the concessions would be meaningless anyway.44  
 Irrespective of Entente double-dealing, the Russians would prove to be the greater threat. 
They knew that Russian guarantees were meaningless because their intelligence services had 
intercepted a telegram from von Giers advising that Russia should press for Ottoman neutrality 
until circumstances were favorable to annex the Bosphorus Straits.45 The Ottomans realized that 
neutrality was quickly becoming more risky than actual participation in the war.  
 Grand Vizier Said Halim Paşa would later explain why his government had rejected all 
Entente assurances and decided to enter the war. Great Britain, France, and Russia had proven 
that they had no intention of honoring their guarantees:  
Had the past actions of these powers been different the page of history now being written 
might have read differently. We were tired of the hypocrisy actuating the powers of the 
Triple Entente when dealing with Turkey, so we did what provocation forced us to do—
went to war. 46 
 
He then defended the Empire’s right to be included as a full member in the international system, 
stating, “we are not a barbaric people, not savage, not black, not brown, not yellow, but white, 
with every right of the other white races…Heretofore we were the pawn in Europe’s politics and 
our interests were wholly unconsidered.”47 Said Halim Paşa was clearly criticizing the Europeans 
for their failure to integrate the Ottomans into the Concert of Europe. He used this failure as 
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proof that they could not trust international laws and agreements to protect the Empire and, as a 
result, the Ottomans had no option but to go to war in order to survive.  
 The Ottomans trusted the Germans more than the Entente Powers. Since the late 1870s, 
the German government had been fostering a relationship with the Empire, and their insistence 
on non-intervention in Ottoman affairs endeared them to the ruling elite.48 When European 
powers were scrutinizing the condition of Christians in the Empire, Kaiser Wilhelm II, for 
example, repeatedly declared German neutrality.49 Germany’s friendship had also prevented total 
Ottoman isolation in a generally hostile international community.50 After the CUP overthrew 
Abdülhamid II in 1909, the new government retained its friendly relationship with Germany.51 
Leadership appreciated that Germany had never desired its territory and, in fact, had preferred a 
strong and stable Empire.52 Germany’s victory in the war would, therefore, not present an 
existential threat to the Empire.  
 The Ottoman’s option for neutrality ended on September 10, when Germany threatened to 
withdraw all support, personnel, and warships if they did not enter the war immediately.53 The 
Entente’s partition plans were now well-known and the Ottomans recognized that if they 
remained neutral they would have to hope for a German victory or suffer the consequences of 
German defeat. Instead, when they received the ultimatum they chose to fight for their survival 
and started preparing for an offensive by drafting military plans and securing Bulgarian 
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assurances of neutrality.54 The Ottomans declared war on October 29 by bombarding the Russian 
port of Sebastopol.55   
The Ottomans entered the First World War because, in the end, they had no other option. 
From as early as the 1870s, they had become mistrustful of international guarantees, and by 1914 
they were certain that British and French assurances for territorial integrity and independence 
were meaningless. They were also well aware of Russian plans for partition and believed that 
Russian acquisition of Ottoman lands would likely lead to the extermination of the Ottoman 
Muslim population. The Ottomans allied with the Central Powers in hopes of weakening their 
enemies and ensuring several years of peace and stability. Ottoman leaders did not enter the war 
for personal gain or out of an opportunistic sense of the inevitability of German victory. Instead 
they chose to take a proactive role in the Empire’s fate rather than wait for an uncertain future.  
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Conclusion 
 The Ottomans entered the First World War as a direct result of European imperialism and 
double-dealing. They could not trust European guarantees in 1914 because history had taught 
them that the Great Powers were unreliable. The European powers were convinced that the 
Tanzimat reforms had made the Empire a civilized state, and inducted them into the Concert of 
Europe at the end of the Crimean War in 1856. In the Treaty of Paris, the Ottomans gained 
guarantees that their territorial integrity and independence would be respected and supported, as 
well as the right to mediation in all conflicts related to their vital interests. The Ottomans trusted 
these guarantees and factored them into their foreign policy, expecting European aid against 
foreign aggression as long as the Empire faithfully adhered to the Tanzimat reforms. In a matter 
of twenty years, however, the Ottomans were to lose confidence in the international system. Prior 
to the Russian-Ottoman War, Ottoman reformers had worked within the system in an effort to 
guarantee the Empire’s security. Unbeknownst to them, Europeans no longer ranked the Empire 
as a civilized state. This rendered European guarantees moot because only civilized states fell 
under the jurisdiction of international law. By 1877, the Ottomans were aware that the Great 
Powers no longer accepted them as equals or as a civilized state. Russia and Great Britain were 
failing to uphold their agreements under the Treaty of Paris. They had abandoned their 
guarantees to maintain the Empire’s territorial integrity and independence, and ignored the 
principles of the Congress of Europe as it applied to the Ottoman state. The danger of the Great 
Powers’ failure to uphold their obligations was immediately obvious to the Ottomans. During 
and immediately after the Russian-Ottoman War, Russia interfered in the Ottoman Balkans, 
aiding in the creation of an independent Bulgaria and the annexation of Ottoman territory to 
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Serbia and Montenegro. 
The Russians and Bulgarians used the war and occupation to exterminate and exile 
Ottoman Muslims in order to create homogenous nation-states in what had been a multicultural, 
multiethnic, and multireligious Balkans. As a result of the Russian-Ottoman War, thousands of 
Muslims were forced to flee to Ottoman Anatolia, which drastically altered the demographic 
composition of the Empire. With Muslims now comprising more than three quarters of the 
population, Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals began to reframe civic Ottomanism by 
emphasizing the Islamic character of the Empire. The process of ethnic cleansing picked up 
dramatically when the Balkan League declared war in 1912 in order to gain what remained of 
Ottoman territory. These atrocities, and the religious nature of the conflict, led Ottoman 
statesmen to view the Empire as the last bastion of Islam in a world of predatory European states. 
By 1914, they were the only Muslim power who could protect their brothers and sisters still 
living in hostile Balkan states. 
The Ottoman entrance into the First World War was a product of the unreliable 
international system and Great Power interference in the Balkans that resulted in the rise of 
violent and chauvinistic Slavic nationalisms. The system did not secure the Empire’s territorial 
integrity and instead led to tremendous losses and the murder, exile, or forced conversion of 
Ottoman Muslims. By 1914, Ottoman statesmen knew that the only way to save the Empire and 
the lives of Ottoman Muslims was through strategic alliances and military strength. They had 
been left severely weakened, financially and militarily, by the Balkan Wars, and the leadership 
recognized that an alliance with Germany was their only chance to survive the war and prevent 
partition.  
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Many scholars have pointed to the advent of Turkish nationalism and the desire to protect 
Turks living within the Empire and across the borders to explain the deeper motives of Ottoman 
statesmen in entering the war. This, however, was not the case in 1914. Ottoman leadership was 
not exclusively concerned with the well-being of ethnic Turks but with the survival of all 
Muslims and the ramifications of the Empire’s collapse on their lives. Ottoman intellectuals had 
yet to fully develop and articulate a distinct Turkish nationalism. Their imperial identity in the 
period before their entrance into the war was still based on a combination of civil and Islamic 
Ottomanism. The CUP’s actions before the war also indicate that the protection of all Muslims, 
irrespective of ethnicity, was the primary driving force behind their policies. 
Entente actions during 1914 also helped convince the Ottomans that war on the side of 
Germany was the only option. The Powers were not willing to give in to Ottoman demands for 
financial assistance and the end of capitulations, but they did promise to maintain Ottoman 
neutrality by guaranteeing the Empire’s territorial integrity and independence, as well as 
adjusting capitulatory treaties after the war. Ottoman statesmen knew these promises were empty 
and chose to ally with Germany in order to save the Empire and, by extension, the lives of 
millions of Muslims for whom they felt responsible. The Russian-Ottoman War of 1877-78 
isolated the Ottoman Empire from the international system, while the Balkan Wars finalized their 
exclusion by forcing the Ottomans into a fatal alliance.   
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Appendix A 
Territorial Changes in the Balkans in the Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin 
 
 
Edward Hertslet, comp., The Map of Europe by Treaty; Showing Various Political and Territorial Changes Which 
Have Taken Place since the General Peace of 1814 with Numerous Maps and Notes (London: Harrison and Sons, 
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Appendix B 
Europe in 1891 
 
 
Edward Hertslet, comp., The Map of Europe by Treaty; Showing Various Political and Territorial Changes Which 
Have Taken Place since the General Peace of 1814 with Numerous Maps and Notes (London: Harrison and Sons, 
1891), IV:3290. 
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Appendix C 
The Balkans 1914 
 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Intercourse and Education, Report of the International 
Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars (Washington: Byron S Adams, 1914), np. 
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